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Introduction and Executive Summary
This report addresses a deceptively simple question: How can the productivity of
American health care be substantially improved? Productivity, in lay terms, is the ratio
of output to inputs. A more colloquial rendition of the question might be: how can
we get a lot more bang for our health care buck?
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No wonder, then, that health care also receives
so much attention. Nonetheless, given its importance,
the subject deserves more thoughtful scrutiny and
practical recommendations. With these objectives in
mind, the Kauffman Foundation, whose primary
mission is to promote entrepreneurship and
innovation throughout the economy, convened
this Task Force on Innovation in Health Care.
We are well aware that there is no dearth
of reports and recommendations for health care
reform. Why another? In a crowded field, this
report seeks to accomplish something different.
First, our task force’s composition is
unconventional, drawn from experts in a wide
range of related, but different, fields: health care
regulation, drug development, data sharing, medical
specialties as different as cardiac surgery and
veterinary medicine, and the policy sciences. The
members have affiliations in academia, industry,
nonprofit groups, health organization executive
suites, medical clinics, labs, and law.1
Second, given the makeup of the Task Force, it
should not be surprising that this report tackles the
vexing problem of health care value and productivity

We rely on this collective expertise by, on occasion in this document, reporting a statistic or measure provided by one or more of our panel members.
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No one doubts that the question needs
answering. By general consent, improving the
cost-benefit balance in America’s health care is today’s
most urgent public policy problem. Costs are rising for
private payers and government (which now accounts
for more than half of all health care spending), but
health outcomes are not rising at the same rate.
Without changes, health costs could stress federal
and state governments to the point of near-insolvency
as the Baby Boom generation ages and as ever more
expensive technology comes online. Health costs
also affect jobs because some employers respond to
rising costs by not hiring more workers, or at least
constraining the take-home pay of those they retain.
Patients, meanwhile, negotiate a fragmented,
confusing, and sometimes seemingly uncaring system,
a product of accumulated accident and unintended
consequences rather than design. Systems built
around the assumptions of the 1950s and 1960s,
when general practitioners could cope with most
health needs, and file cabinets and postage stamps
were the main methods of storing and transmitting
data, creak and strain in the age of email, the cloud,
and increasingly regulatory complexity.
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from some angles different than those typically found
in reports or studies in this policy area.
This report represents the distillation of the
collective wisdom of the Task Force members. They
were not asked to support every suggestion or idea
put forth here or to approve the precise wording of
this entire report; requiring unanimity would have
ruled out too many good ideas. Instead, we present
here a “sense of the room” as to which approaches
hold the most promise (and which are overrated) and
what the basic choices are. Despite our multiplicity of
perspectives, we found many points of intersection.
We canvassed what we call the adjacent
possible—that is, incremental, but important,
workable reforms that should improve the productivity
of health care and its value independent of whether
and how the recently enacted Affordable Care Act
of 2010 is ultimately implemented.2 We did not seek
giant, dramatic steps; we avoided sweeping claims
and rejected purported magic bullets. We believe
that a quest for sweeping, comprehensive, one-shot
reform is problematic because it misconceives the
health care system as an engineered “system” rather
than a natural ecosystem, perhaps as intricate and
complex as anything to be found in nature.
Instead, we focus primarily on incremental
changes which, taken together, can cumulate to
significantly advance both productivity of health
care and its outcomes. These reforms build on or
accelerate changes whose implementation runs with,
not against, the grain of the health system’s existing
stakeholders and structures. We thus sought to avoid
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measures requiring massive new expenditures. Some
of the regulatory or structural changes we recommend
would gore established interests’ oxen. But they have
in common the virtue that, as the saying goes, you
can get there from here.
Finally, we have chosen measures for their
exemplary value, as well as for their intrinsic
merits. They point toward a promising general
strategy: releasing and putting to work resources
that, for whatever reason, the current system has
locked up. Japanese automakers’ leap forward in
productivity came, in the main, not from technological
breakthroughs unavailable to Detroit or from
out-investing Detroit, but from better use of existing
resources: freeing up the knowledge of assembly-line
workers, implementing real-time quality controls,
reorganizing and streamlining supply chains, and
putting the customer at the center of the system.
In that sense, the Japanese automakers unlocked a
leaner, more productive, more modern form within
the confines of an older system.
In much the same way, we propose the
“jail-breaking” of health care. Our health care
system is rife with opportunities to improve
productivity by using existing resources better—
resources that include not just money, but the talent,
organizational skill, and knowledge of practitioners,
providers, researchers, and (especially, in our view)
patients. Much as the cheapest and often fastest
source of new energy is the more efficient use of old
energy, so the cheapest and fastest road to a more
productive health system is to put untapped value
to work.

 e borrow the term “adjacent possible” from Steven Johnson, who coined it. See Steven Johnson. Where Good Ideas Come From: A History of
W
Innovation (Riverhead Trade, 2011, reprint edition).

n Harnessing information: how systematically
gathering and sharing data can unlock knowledge
that produces systematically better choices. The
key here is to incentivize a new corps of data
entrepreneurs to collect and analyze existing
medical data to discover and then disseminate
the use of new therapies.
n Improving research: encouraging more
collaboration across institutions and funding more
translational research (aimed at “translating” basic
scientific discoveries into medicines and therapies).
n Legal and regulatory reform: modernizing
medical malpractice systems, removing
counter-productive restrictions on health insurance
premiums, and streamlining new drug approvals.
n Empowering patients: there are large
benefits of giving more power to the people
who matter most—patients—to make informed
decisions about their own care.
The ideas here are not new, though many of
them are familiar only to the cognoscenti. To the
contrary, we have sought ideas that have showed
promise in the field, and then attempted to set them
in a context that exploits the adjacent possible.
If this report can focus more minds in the health
policy community and general public on finding and
implementing those changes, in everything from
clinical practices to regulatory structures, it will
have succeeded.
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Localism is another common thread running
through many of our suggestions. Although
cross-cutting changes to policy or regulation
sometimes are needed, too much time and energy are
focused on top-down, Washington-directed reforms.
This is true especially now, as the new Affordable Care
Act (ACA) effectively has exhausted, for the time
being, the country’s capacity for sweeping change
at the federal level. Particularly while the ACA is being
digested, implemented, and perhaps modified, most
effective change will be locally designed or adapted to
local conditions, often varying from region to region,
provider to provider, and even patient to patient.
What we can generalize, however, are changes
in incentives that help identify and propagate
productivity improvements. Much as a hydrologist
uses general principles of geology and fluid
dynamics to understand where to build or to remove
dams or levees to change flows through a larger
system, so understanding and using incentives
better can point the way toward health productivity
improvements tailored to particular regions, providers,
and patient populations.
By design, we have brought together a varied
assortment of ideas and suggestions, illustrating the
messy, grab-bag nature that effective changes often
need to take. Yet our proposals do fall (albeit with
some overlap) into four broad categories, which
structure the recommendations section of this report.
Our specific policy recommendations are summarized
in the table at the end of this Introduction.
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Data Recommendations
Policy
Recommendation

Description

Portable consent
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 llow patients and
A
research subjects in
studies to give their
consent for their health
data to be included in
large research databases.


	
Data from outside
the health care system

Deployment
	The government should permit patients
the right to let whomever they choose
access their medical records efficiently
and easily. The Department of Health and
Human Services could provide regulatory
assurance that there will be no punitive
action against experimental pilot projects
to pool health data. If HHS does not
believe it has this authority, it should
request it from Congress.

	Circumvent the health
care system, which is not
designed for the collection
of data, and legal privacy
concerns by collecting
health data outside the
medical system.

	The thousands of nonprofit
organizations actively involved in
studying diseases should partner to
build a national health database.
Employers should include as part of
health benefits packages information
on how employees can contribute their
health data.

Sharing publicly
funded data

	Similar to how the
National Institutes of
Health already requires
the sharing of research
funded by the federal
government, data
developed from federal
grants also should be
publicly available.

	The National Institutes of Health could
more strictly enforce existing rules and
otherwise require that federally funded
data be shared, and that all grants require
data-sharing plans. Follow-on NIH funding
could be conditioned on data making it to
the public domain and being re-used.

Curating data

	As more data becomes
available, the need for
interoperability and ease
of using the data becomes
even more important.

	Research grants could include some
funding for data scrubbing, whether
performed by the original researchers
or by outside experts. The federal
government or a nonprofit organization
also could take the lead in developing
computer programming scripts that could
automatically re-compile data into a
standardized, accepted format.

	

Data Recommendations—continued

Policy
Recommendation
Life certificate

Description

	The federal government should fund
research and development of the life
certificate concept.

Research Recommendations
Policy
Recommendation
Teams for research


	Encouraging translational
research

Description

Deployment

	Break down the isolation
of researchers and
encourage collaborative,
crosscutting research
by creating teams of
researchers from across
multiple institutions.

	The National Institutes of Health could
condition a portion of its R01 and other
grants on being awarded to teams of
researchers, with larger average grants
made available to larger teams.

	Efforts to encourage
translational efforts, such
as the National Center for
Advancing Translational
Sciences at NIH, should
be strengthened and
accelerated.

	Translational research should be viewed
as a discipline in its own right, supported
by funding models that encourage
interdisciplinary, applied research and
nourished by a stream of researchers
trained specifically in college for
translation.

Kauffman Task Force on Cost-Effective Health Care Innovation

	Birth and death certificates
already exist. The “life
certificate” is a bundle
of standardized health
information that would
travel with consumers and
accumulate as they pass
through health-related
gateways: vaccinations,
procedures, medications,
family history, and so on.

Deployment

7

Research Recommendations—continued

Policy
Recommendation
	Conducting comparative
effectiveness research (CER)
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Description

	The 2009 stimulus bill
and 2010 Affordable Care
Act both provide for the
federal government to
both fund and become
more directly involved in
conducting CER, studies
that compare the
effectiveness of new
drugs and treatments
against existing options.

Deployment

	Comparative effectiveness research
should be pursued in both the private
and public sectors. While public good
considerations favor public sector
involvement, policymakers also should
recognize that the federal government
can have out-sized impacts on private
sector practices potentially before
definitive results are in and innovations
have a chance to prove themselves.
	Efficiency research on the delivery
system deserves the same level of attention
from federal funding as research on new
treatments; whether that effort should
be located within NIH, in HHS’s Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality, or in
some new center or institute is a subject of
debate. Employers can and should demand
that providers do a better job of tracking
efficiency and subject health care costs to
the same kinds of negotiations with
vendors as are other expenses and inputs.
The government should report Medicare
data with a lag of weeks or months, and
the cost to receive it should be reduced.
	Efforts to promote patient-centric
Value-driven Engineering should be
expanded. VdE holds promise for
streamlining the development of new
drugs and the delivery of health care, with
better results for patients at lower cost.

Legal and Regulatory Reform Recommendations
Policy
Recommendation

Description

Deployment

	Malpractice reform has
long been on the health
system’s agenda and is far
past due. Patients, jurors,
and judges involved in
malpractice lawsuits
generally lack the
expertise to evaluate
medical decision-making,
the incentive to do so
with detachment, or both.

	A “no fault” system that sets up a
compensation system outside of the
courts, with expert evaluators providing
payments based on fee schedules is
one approach. A second approach is
to change liability rules by capping
noneconomic damages and eliminating
punitive damages. A third option is to
channel medical malpractice claims into
special “health courts” where the
decision-makers are former or retired
physicians or other medical experts. The
Affordable Care Act has taken the first
step by encouraging pilot projects for
health courts at the state level.

	Reform the “Medical
Loss Ratio” Rule

	The Affordable Care Act
dictates that every health
insurer must spend at least
80 percent to 85 percent
of premiums on medical
care (payouts as a share
of total premiums). This
rule gives no incentive
for insurers to reduce
overhead beyond minimal
requirements.

	Eliminate the medical loss ratio mandate.
A second-best option would be to expand
MLR to make greater allowance for profit.

	A “quality-adjusted life
year” is a concept used
by health care analysts to
examine benefits versus
cost tradeoffs in health
care treatment. QALY is
a key consideration in
reducing low-value care.

	Overturn the ban from the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act that
bars the government from developing
guidelines or policies based on QALYs.

	Consider QALY

Kauffman Task Force on Cost-Effective Health Care Innovation

	Options for malpractice
reform
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Legal and Regulatory Reform Recommendations—continued

Policy
Recommendation

Description

Deployment
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	Encourage diagnostics

	Diagnostic tests are a
largely underutilized form
of preventive medicine.
The medical research
system, public and private,
should invest more in
diagnostics relative to
treatments.

	Medicare and other government programs
should make a definitive decision on
reimbursing most diagnostic procedures,
and the Food and Drug Administration
should make a definitive decision on
whether diagnostics will be regulated.
Resolving this uncertainty would give
an economic incentive for commercial
researchers to develop and clinicians to
adopt them.

	Interim approval for new
drugs and devices

	Clinical trials can only
go so far in establishing
the safety of new drugs
and devices. A post-trial
“interim” approval stage
would provide a good
balance between safety
and bringing new drugs
and devices to market
faster.

	The FDA could establish an interim
approval stage for new drugs and devices.
During this phase, the new drug or device
would be released only to physicians
who have been trained to handle it and
monitor the results. Developers would
receive protection from legal liability during
the probationary period; a share of sales
proceeds could be set aside for a fund to
pay for compensatory care for patients
with bad reactions.
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Patient Involvement Recommendations
Policy
Recommendation
	Promote shared
decision-making

Description
	Shared decision-making
refers to the practice of a
physician advising patients
on their options, laying
out pros and cons for a
procedure, and helping
patients understand and
make choices about the
kind of treatment they
receive. Some states have
experimented with
measures to promote
shared decision-making.

Deployment
	Policy should strive to move shared
decision-making through the experimental
stage and toward broader adoption. The
government’s new Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Innovation (created by the
Affordable Care Act) should make a point
of funding pilot programs in every state;
state legislatures should revise laws to
make shared decision-making the gold
standard of informed consent.

Organization and Delivery Reform Recommendations
Policy
Recommendation

Description

Deployment

	The Affordable Care Act
seeks to promote ACOs,
networks of providers
that are accountable for
and reimbursed based on
patient outcomes.

	Policymakers of both parties should
continue the ACO and Accountable Care
Community (ACC) experiments for a
sufficiently long period to assess whether
their promise is fulfilled.

	Focus physicians in acute
and integrative care; allow
others to take charge of
wellness and integrative
care.

	Health care can largely
be categorized into four
kinds of care—acute,
chronic, wellness, and
integrative. Chronic and
wellness care mostly are
routine and do not need
high-priced physicians to
actively manage them.

	Reform state licensing restrictions to
allow nurse practitioners and other
non-physicians to do more with respect
to chronic and wellness care, and change
Medicare rules to allow reimbursement
for more treatments performed by nurse
practitioners.

	Reducing over-capacity
and over-use

	Use Medicare’s payment
leverage to encourage
more focus on high-value
care.

	Medicare should not pay to use drugs
in ways the FDA deems ineffective,
nor support treatments regarded as
inappropriate by standard guidelines.

	Developing electronic
medical records (EMRs)

	The health care
industry lags behind
other sectors in the
adoption and integration
of information
technologies. EMRs are
viewed by many as the
next big step in bringing
health care to the modern
technological age.

	The development of EMRs should focus
on improving service—reducing repetitive
patient paperwork and integrating
billing and other back-office processes
with medical functions; it is unlikely that
EMRs will contain the sort of information
that will be useful for research, nor are
EMRs likely to be a “silver bullet” answer
to cost problems.

Kauffman Task Force on Cost-Effective Health Care Innovation

Expanding Accountable
	Care Organizations
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A Record of Innovation

Chapter One
Contours of the Problem

12

3
4

National Vital Statistics 59(1): 33–34, Table 12 (June 28, 2010).
CDC, MMWR Report 48(38): 849–858 (October 1, 1999).

If the United States had accomplished
nothing else in the past hundred years, it would be
remembered in history for its extraordinary record of
medical innovation. In a century of staggeringly
rapid improvements in medical knowledge and
technology throughout the West and Asia, the
United States towers over others. Odd though it
may seem, at the dawn of the twentieth century,
the United States was a medical backwater
relative to Europe; but the second half of the century
saw a remarkable flowering of science, technology,
and innovation, supported and driven by the world’s
largest economy and the world’s greatest scientific
and academic infrastructure. One might say, without
undue fear of exaggeration and despite the current
angst over health care cost and quality in the United
States, as the Italy of the High Renaissance is to art,
so America of the past sixty or so years has been to
medicine.
Benefits from these advances have been valued
in the trillions of dollars and have led to a consistently
higher quality of life for people all over the world.
Quantity of life has improved, too. Health care
advances have contributed—along with improvements
in living standards, safer workplaces and childhood
vaccinations—to an increase in life expectancy at
birth, which for Americans rose from forty-seven in
1900 to seventy-seven in 2000 (an astonishing gain
of 110 days per year or two days per week during the
twentieth century).3 One reason for this remarkable
improvement is the dramatic drop in infant mortality
of more than 90 percent (coupled with the 99-plus
percent decline in maternal mortality) over the
century. In addition, the two decades from 1930
through 1949 alone, a period including the Great
Depression, remarkably saw the introduction of
electrolyte therapy and use of antibiotics,
accompanied by a 52 percent drop in infant mortality.4

China (with Taiwan) 1%
Netherlands 1%
Denmark 1%
Belgium 1%
Australia 1%
Spain 2%
Sweden 2%
Italy 2%
Switzerland 2%
Canada 3%
France 5%

Others 6%

United States 50%

Germany 6%

United Kingdom 7%

Japan 10%
Sources: Global Forums for Health Research estimates based on official data from
official reports to OECD and RICYT, national surveys, pharmaceutical associations,
and other publications.

poured a large amount of funding into such research.
In 2000, for example, countries that make up the
European Union devoted just $3.7 billion to medical
research for a population that was 25 percent larger.
As the chart shows, the United States, by itself,
accounted in 2005 for roughly half the world’s
annual health R&D expenditures.11

Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, “The Value of Health and Longevity,” Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5, (2006): 871–904.
Ibid.
7 William D. Nordhaus, “Health of Nations: The Contribution of Improved Health to Living Standards,” in Measuring Gains from Medical
Research: An Economic Approach, ed. Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 9–40.
8 Forty percent of this amount comes from the federal government. Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, “The Value of Health and Longevity,”
Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5, (2006): 871–904.
9 Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, “The Economic Value of Medical Research,” in Measuring Gains from Medical Research: An Economic
Approach, ed. Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 41–73.
10 See Chart of NIH appropriations adjusted by OMB price deflator.
11 Mary Anne Burke and Jean-Jacques Monot, “Global financing and flows,” in Mary Anne Burke and Stephen A. Matlin, eds., Monitoring
Resource Flows for Health Research 2008 (Geneva, CH: Global Forum for Health Research), p. 29 and Fig. 2.3.
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Gains in both general wellness and in treatments
and cures for specific diseases have generated large
welfare gains. Although those gains cannot, of course,
be fully assessed in terms of dollars, their economic
value is impressive nonetheless. Kevin Murphy and
Robert Topel estimate that, from 1970 to 2000,
national wealth increased by $3.2 trillion per year
and cumulatively (in present discounted value) by
more than $95 trillion total (about half of GDP)
through increases in longevity.5 For heart disease
alone, reduced mortality contributed roughly
$1.5 trillion per year to the value of life since
1970.6 William Nordhaus estimates that increases
in longevity have been as valuable as all other
sources of economic growth combined.7
Generating many of these medical improvements
have been substantial investments in research and
development. To spur medical innovation, the United
States funds (publicly and privately) more than $60
billion per year in medical research.8 Real spending on
medical research increased 61 percent from 1980 to
1995 and 23 percent from 1990 to 1995 alone.9
The largest single health research agency is the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), whose annual
appropriations rose by more than 4,000-fold in
inflation-adjusted dollars, from $700,000 going into
World War II to $30 billion in 2010.10 Even compared
to other developed countries, the United States

13
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No one would deny the importance and
beneficence of medical progress, other things being
equal. And few ordinary Americans like to entertain
the question of, for example, how much an extra year
of life is worth; most people esteem the value of life
as infinite. Policymakers cannot afford to think that
way, however. They are required to ask, as in every
other area of life, not just whether something good
happened as a result of a dollar spent, but whether
that dollar might have been better spent elsewhere—
the concept of opportunity cost, as economists call it.
If a dollar spent on cleaning up the water supply can
prevent as many deaths as hundreds of dollars spent
on hospital beds, then, in a world of limited resources,
sewage treatment is the better investment. In the
United States, medical progress has been paired with
ever-increasing expenditure on health care, leading
many to question whether such expenditures and
their allocation are worthwhile investments in the
first place.
In principle, medical research spending should
generate huge payoffs. For example, Murphy and
Topel estimate that a 1 percent decline in cancer
mortality would be worth about $500 billion, which
implies that an additional $100 billion in research
would be worthwhile even if there were only a
one-in-five chance that such spending would lead to
that 1 percent reduction in mortality. Whether
medical research funding—especially by the federal
government—is leading to optimal results, however,
is another matter. There is reason to believe it is not.
The large investments in medical R&D have been
accompanied by even larger and more rapidly growing

$1,500,000
$1,000,000
$500,000
$0
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008

The Price of Progress

national health care expenditures, as the chart above
indicates. Between 1960 and 1998, per capita real
spending on health care went up by 4.9 percent per
household, while wages only increased 2 percent.12
In the first decade of the present century, the
situation grew, if anything, even worse. According to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the inflation-adjusted
average hourly compensation of American workers
—that is, the value of workers’ total pay packages,
including health insurance and other employerprovided benefits—grew by 1.3 percent a year from
2000 to 2009. By postwar standards, even that rate of
growth would be counted by most as disappointing.
Greatly compounding the sting of slow growth,
however, has been that less than half of the increase
in real compensation (including benefits) has flowed
through to workers’ average wages and salaries (their
paychecks), with the remainder (0.7 percentage points
per year) being siphoned off by rising health insurance
costs.13 One way to think of this is the rising costs of
health care exact a painfully escalating health care tax
on a hard-pressed workforce. And yet, adding insult to
injury, the growing hit to paychecks has not reduced
personal spending on health care: in 1960, the
average person spent $700 on health care, but by
2006 that number had grown to $6,000, while the
ratio of health spending to GDP had tripled.14 Directly
and indirectly, Americans are paying more for health
care—and more, and more.

 evin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, “The Economic Value of Medical Research,” in Measuring Gains from Medical Research: An Economic
K
Approach, ed. Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 41–73.
13 http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/12/exploring-link-between-rising-health-insurance-premiums-and-stagnant-wages, accessed July
29, 2011.
14 David Cutler, Allison B. Rosen, and Sandeep Vijan, “Value of Medical Innovation in the United States: 1960–2000,” New England Journal of
Medicine 355, no. 9 (2006): 920–927.
12

between 1993 and 2010, the number of new
FDA-approved drugs dropped from more than fifty
in 1996 to just twenty-one in 2010.18

Drivers of Cost
Why the rapid cost growth? Partly for “good”
reasons; that is, because of changes that either
are desirable or inevitable. One factor is that the
population is getting older as people live longer.
Longer lives are desirable, and no one wants to
shorten them; but, in medical terms, added years
toward the end of life are expensive. Moreover, the
country has grown richer, and wealthier people spend
more on health care—a perfectly reasonable choice
for them to make, at least if the choice is based on
sound information and is guided and constrained by
accurate market signals.19 Where the market functions
efficiently, rising discretionary expenditures efficiently
reflect changing preferences.
Unfortunately, no one seriously disputes
that health care markets are far from efficient. A
combination of insufficient information, poor
incentives for cost control (indeed, the very opposite)
created by third-party insurance (both private and
public), and inefficiencies in health care research—all
of those factors have led to much waste.20 By one
estimate, of the $2.5 trillion spent on health care in
the United States in 2010, $700 billion was not
necessary.21

 lan M. Garber and Jonathan Skinner, “Is American Health Care Uniquely Inefficient?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 4 (September
A
2008): 27–50.
16 Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
17 Congressional Budget Office, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook.” Congress of the United States, November 2010.
18 For NIH appropriations, see http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/appropriations/part2.htm. For new drug approval, defined as New Molecular
Entities and New Biological Agents, see the historical data at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/UCM123959.pdf and the most recent fully completed calendar year 2010 and http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/UCM242677.pdf.
19 Cutler, et al., 2006, Cutler 2004, Murphy and Topel 2006, Hall and Jones 2007.
20 See Amitabh Chandra and Jonathan S. Skinner, “Technology and Expenditure Growth in Health Care,” (National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge, 2009) and David Cutler, “Where Are the Health Care Entrepreneurs? The Failure of Organization Innovation in Health Care,” (Working
Paper 16030, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 2010).
21 David Cutler, “Where Are the Health Care Entrepreneurs? The Failure of Organization Innovation in Health Care,” (Working Paper 16030, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 2010).
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Many countries face their own versions of a
health care cost crisis, but the United States,
unfortunately, leads the way. Compared to other
countries, the United States spends much more than
similar economies do. In 2006, 15 percent of the
United States’ GDP was spent on health care,
compared with 11 percent in France and Germany,
and 10 percent in the United Kingdom and Japan.15
Rapidly escalating health care costs are also at the
heart of the long-term structural deficits of the state
and federal governments. At the federal level alone,
Medicare and Medicaid spending represented 5.3
percent of GDP in 2009,16 and unless the benefit
structures in these programs are changed, their
combined costs should reach 11 percent by 2035
and keep rising thereafter.17 Clearly, this “excess”
health care growth—the amount by which health care
costs grow faster than GDP—is unsustainable in the
long run. As is now widely recognized, the cost trends
in health care—consistently increasing at roughly
2.5 percentage points faster than the general rate of
inflation—cannot continue forever, and perhaps not
even for much longer.
Finally, to make matters even worse, the huge
United States government-funded research effort is
not delivering the best bang for the buck, either.
By one measure, research productivity has dropped
noticeably over time: despite a major increase in
federal funding for the National Institutes of Health

15
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An important reason for the inefficiency—some
experts argue it is the most important reason—is that,
with the tax incentives employers and employees have
to purchase excessive, and excessively costly, health
care insurance, all health care providers thus have
incentives to provide increasingly expensive health
care products and services. Now, the widespread
availability of health insurance is, without doubt, a
good thing. In an era when critical medical
intervention often involves complex and ruinously
expensive procedures undreamt of several decades
ago, few Americans would question the value—
indeed, often the indispensability—of insurance
coverage for non-routine health care costs, or the
medical equivalent of major car accidents or natural
catastrophes. Creating a hybrid public-private health
insurance infrastructure was one of the great
social-policy achievements of the postwar era. But
most Americans with private insurance get it through
their employers, so they have little incentive or ability
to shop around—indeed, they have every reason to
press their employers for a Cadillac health plan instead
of a Chevrolet that covers virtually all health care
spending, minus a modest annual deductible and
per-physician deductible. Each member of the
chain—patient, provider, insurer—feels comfortable
offloading higher costs onto the next, so crucial
trade-offs are never made.
With costs hidden by insurance from ultimate
consumers, and with the public insatiably hungry for
new high-tech elixirs, health care innovation to date
in the United States has been largely cost-enhancing.
Gone are the days when physicians would be careful
about ordering tests or diagnostics. To the contrary,
today, doctors routinely order an x-ray (or many
x-rays), or frequently an MRI or CT scan, before even
attempting a diagnosis and treatment. They are
heavily influenced by the knowledge that their
patients’ insurance will pay for the procedures, a
knowledge compounded by fear of a malpractice

lawsuit if some patients suffer a major misfortune and
not every test had been ordered. Moreover, ordering
the test helps the hospital or clinic that bought
the machine recoup its investment and covers the
salaries of the folks in the radiology department.
The test does, of course, sometimes produce useful
information, even if only in some cases and at the
margin, or if it only corroborates a clinical impression.

More Knowledge, Better Incentives
As we hope the discussion so far brings home,
the knots in the U.S. health care system would be
comparatively easy to untie if they all were the result
of purely irrational flaws or historical flukes. Some
undoubtedly are; the linkage of health insurance
to employment, for example, arose as a result of a
quirk in the tax code, but its persistence today causes
pervasive economic distortions and leaves millions of
Americans stranded without health insurance when
they lose their jobs and thus are at their most
vulnerable.
But the central problem is that many of health
care’s problems, to the contrary, are byproducts
not of the system’s flaws but of its virtues. That is
why we reject the quest for magic bullets, whether
in the form of single-payer national insurance, at one
extreme, or at the other, by getting the government
out of subsidizing care, even solely by vouchers.
Whatever the merits or shortcomings of either of
those approaches, neither can change the fact that
any innovation that helps people live longer and
higher-quality lives will tend to increase the
consumption of care by ensuring that more people
are around to consume it; any system that provides
the security of insurance will insulate consumers from
many of the costs of their health care choices; and any
breakthrough in treatment of a medical condition is
likely to make people more complacent about
prevention.

In our view, too many of the changes under
public discussion would move money around in the
system without revising the underlying incentives or
gathering the knowledge that determines how
efficiently the money is spent. We are struck that the
state of the debate seems to be something like, on
the one hand, “If you want more cures, let drug
companies make more money” (by extending the
life of drug patents, for example, and developing
me-too drugs); and, on the other hand, “If you want
to reduce costs, reduce government spending” (by
limiting federal liability or simply cutting entitlements
and assuming that the system will adjust to lower
payment). Instead, we propose measures that
introduce new efficiency-driving information into
the system, reduce wasted motion, or both.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services now administer almost $900 billion a year in
spending;22 add another hundred billion or so for the
VA, military health systems, the Indian Health Service,
and the Federal Employee Health Benefits Plan, and
we are at more than $1 trillion federal dollars spent on
health goods and services every year—about the same
as the United Kingdom’s entire government budget
(including the National Health Service).23 Add another
trillion or so on health care spending in the private
sector, overwhelmingly reimbursed by private insurers.
This complex aggregate we know as the “U.S. health
care system” is a huge and complicated organism
that takes in huge amounts of dollars and generates
immeasurable amounts of information. But what do
we currently do with all the data created? Without an
infrastructure to support it, all this information goes
to waste. The next chapter speaks to how to leverage
this information to combat inefficiencies in our health
care system and improve patient outcomes.

In 2009, combined Medicare and Medicaid Services’ national health expenditures were roughly $867 billion, as reported by the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health Statistics Group, https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf.
23 Total U.K. public spending was about £632 billion in 2010–2011, or just over $1 trillion in July 2011. Data: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
pesa_2011_tables_chapter4.xlsx (downloaded from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pespub_pesa11.htm).
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Our approach, then, is to accept the inevitability
of tradeoffs and second-best outcomes while looking
for ways to better design incentives. Fortunately, there
is plenty of room for improvement, even recognizing
the complexity of the innovation ecosystem for health
care and health-related technologies, the elusiveness
of causal networks, and the fact that medical
spending and technology often are highly beneficial.
Today’s health care system provides insufficient
incentives to develop and use lower-cost,
higher-return technologies instead of higher-cost,
lower-return ones.
For example: today’s incentives seem to
induce creation of very high-cost, incremental
improvements (think Avastin® for cancer care)
that financially reward those who develop and
commercialize the innovations, but provide little
improvement in health outcomes and relatively weak
incentives to stop smoking, get exercise, and eat right,
or to invest in health information systems that might
increase system efficiency. How could we get cheaper
cancer therapies and more polio vaccines, rather than
innovations of relatively little incremental benefit?
How can we better harness patients’ own immune
systems to prevent and treat disease, rather than
relying on devices and drugs to do these jobs? The
need for answers intensifies as the wave of baby
boomers becomes eligible for Medicare and costs
continue to rise for both Medicare and Medicaid.
Building a cost-effective health care system of the
future can and should be done in layers—just as is
done in technical networks—to allow the separation
of concerns in such a way that it is possible to
experiment in new layers while continuing to rein in
costs in the existing ones. If the experiments pay off,
they can be integrated, rather than ripping out the
existing system for something entirely untested.
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Chapter TWO
Unlocking and Unleashing
the Power of Information

Conventional wisdom holds that modern
information management holds great untapped
potential for health care quality improvements
and cost savings. This is an instance where the
conventional wisdom is right. Less widely understood,
however, especially among the general public, is
where that potential lies. The answer is: not in
doctors’ offices, nor in hospitals.
When most Americans think about “health care
IT” (health care information technology), they think
about electronic medical records. And well they
should. Medical record-keeping in the United States
is, in general, pitiably obsolete, with records still
scrawled on paper charts and stored in file drawers
and cubbyholes, as they were a century ago.
Correcting this problem holds promise of dramatically
improving the experience of the health care customer,
and also promises to reduce back-office inefficiency—
points we will return to later in this report.
Creating a more seamless consumer experience
and a more efficient back office, however, merely
scratches the surface of what can be done with
information technology—and the key is not so much
the technology as the information. An information
revolution now is taking place in retailing via Amazon,
entertainment via Netflix, and targeted advertising via
Google and Facebook, among many other examples.
Digital merchants, social networks, and data
mining entrepreneurs are assembling countless bits
and bytes of information about consumer preferences,
transactions, and outcomes, agglomerating them,
and creating algorithms that can predict what people
need, help them find it, and deliver it efficiently. Every
day, millions upon millions of grocery store purchases
and reward card scans generate electronic records that
pour into databases, telling retailers and
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produce highest patient satisfaction, and, no less
important, which therapies are not cost-effective.
In principle, with proper privacy safeguards,
medical data could be cross-referenced with DNA
data to uncover new targets for drug research, to
design individualized therapies, and to tailor
best-practice guidelines not just for whole diseases
but for particular patients. For cancer, for example,
doctors prescribe first-line therapies that they know
will not work in three-fourths of patients with
metastatic breast and colon cancer—they just
don’t know which three-fourths.25 Combining larger
datasets on drug response with genomic data on
patients could steer therapies to the people they are
most likely to help. The result would be to reduce
substantially the need for trial-and-error medicine,
with all its discomforts, high costs, and sometimes
tragically wrong guesses.
So why hasn’t all this been done? There is no
shortage of raw information in the health care
system. But it is locked in medical offices and hospitals
across the country, and in the files of pharmaceutical
companies who guard the results of their failed clinical
trials. To become data, medical information needs
to be collected, unlocked, converted to standardized
formats, and then entered into databases. And to
become knowledge, these data must be sorted and
analyzed by information experts and their algorithms,
teasing out hidden patterns and thereby finding
needles in the haystacks. Finally, to become care,
knowledge needs to be disseminated and acted upon
by clinicians, insurers, regulators, and politicians.

Top Breast Cancer Myths, American Cancer Society.
See, e.g., Burzykowksi, et al., “Evaluation of Tumor Response, Disease Control, Progression-Free Survival, and Time to Progression as Potential 		
Surrogate End Points in Metastatic Breast Cancer,” Journal of Clinical Oncology, 2008: 26, 1987–1992.
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distributors who their customers are, what customers
want more of, what kinds of promotions work, and
where inventories are tight. Yet virtually none of these
tools is in use in medicine, where it could work far
greater wonders than in retailing.
For instance, about 70 percent to 80 percent of
women who develop breast cancer do not have a
first-degree-relative family history of the disease, so
clearly non-genetic factors must be at work.24 As one
clinician puts it, “We’re missing something big.” Or,
perhaps more accurately, we’re missing much that
is small. The country faces more than 200,000 new
breast cancer cases every year, each treated as
individual cases, or a few occasionally bundled
together for research purposes. Studies can compare
selected patient populations in detail on a small scale,
and they can make gross comparisons on a large
scale. But the factor or factors that cause those 70
percent to 80 percent of unpredictable breast cancer
cases are, as of today, falling through the cracks,
invisible to the crude optics of the health care sector’s
data systems.
Instead, imagine a world in which breast cancer
cases, their courses of treatment, and their outcomes
were routinely uploaded to a database. Another river
of data would flow in from women who have not
had breast cancer. Pattern analysis could search and
compare many thousands of cases across hundreds of
variables for clues as to which factors increase or
decrease risk of disease, which methods most
effectively and safely extend life, which do so at the
lowest cost relative to years gained, which treatments
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Each of those steps poses challenges. Among the
leading causes of resistance are:
n
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Legal barriers and privacy concerns.
Patient records are treated as confidential by
HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996) and other laws, and
for good reason. Also for good reason, medical
ethics rules require patients to give informed
consent before they can be treated as research
subjects. Though well intentioned, these sorts
of rules have a rising cost. Written in an age before
data mining and its potential benefits were well
understood, they introduce friction into the process
of collecting, sharing, and analyzing data. Instead
of balancing privacy against discovery, the current
system puts policy’s thumb so much on the side of
privacy that it has the practical effect of locking in
information, restricting it to the smallest possible
“need-to-know” circle.

n T
 echnical and semantic issues. Merely
uploading information into a database is not very
useful if the data are in a multiplicity of formats
that cannot “talk” to each other or be easily
compared. Nor can information be compared
widely if semantics are not standardized; if, that
is, different data gatherers use the same labels to
mean different things. In the health sector, there is
no equivalent of the domain-name standardization
of the Internet. Some kinds of analysis, such as a
Google search, can tease out valuable information
merely by looking at where words appear and how
they connect, without knowing what people think
the words mean. In medicine, however, consistent
conceptual categorization is particularly important.

n

Constraints on talent and expertise. In
the financial and Internet sectors, the economic
value of data collection and analysis is high, and
the cost of gathering and accessing data is low. As
a result, Wall Street and Silicon Valley are magnets
for data-jockeying talent. In today’s health sector,
by contrast, the economic value of data collection
and analysis is low, and the cost of gathering and
accessing data is high. Predictably, therefore, the
health sector draws little data mining talent and
offers few financial rewards with which to attract
it; nor is data mining talent being systematically
trained and acclimated for the health care sector.
In effect, the cost and reward structures in health
care send a two-word message to potential data
entrepreneurs: “Don’t bother.”

n Cultural and policy resistance.
Physicians and principal investigators usually are
acculturated to protect and hoard information, not
routinely share it. The default assumption is that
information collected here stays here, unless there
is a particular reason to move it somewhere else.
This cultural predilection often exacerbates the
already-restrictive effects of privacy constraints—
and privacy constraints, in turn, often excuse the
hoarding of information. Moreover, at the policy
level, processing and uploading information,
where infrastructure exists to do so, is costly, and
currently neither public programs nor private
insurers pay for it. Moreover, if the research funder
does not require the sharing of data, it doesn’t
happen. Not surprisingly, people prioritize that
which they are compensated for doing or are
required to do.
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system will encounter significant resistance. Adopting
instead incremental, but open and extendable,
approaches makes it possible to detect where the
value emerges and to target additional investments
there rather than to bet big and risk failure. This is
particularly true with strategies that change incentives at the health sector’s data choke points, or which
bypass those bottlenecks altogether.

Better Data and More of It: Reducing and
Circumventing Obstacles
How can data entrepreneurship be incentivized,
rather than discouraged? Data entrepreneurs are
analysts who, seeking profits, or knowledge, or both,
wade into seas of data, much of which may seem
valueless on its face, and discover innovative ways to
mine it for new insights. Though data entrepreneurs
are no substitute for the patient trials and controlled
experiments that are the gold standard for clinical and
scientific research, they can process large amounts of
information very quickly: in days or hours, as opposed
to years for traditional research. Perhaps more
important, they need not know what it is they are
looking for. In many cases, entirely unexpected
patterns may fall out of the data.
The role of the data entrepreneur, then, is to
invest time and expertise prospecting for patterns.
Doing that, in turn, requires that the data supply be
reasonably large and the cost of accessing and
analyzing it be reasonably low—conditions that do not
exist in American health care today. Indeed, the cost
of data entrepreneurship is probably higher in health
care than in almost any other sector of the economy.
Many of the finest data analysts in the country, for
example, are focused on visualization, analysis,

McKinsey Global Institute, Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity, May 2011, pp. 49–50.
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These barriers are daunting. They are aggravated
by the fact that much information that would be of
use in a productive health data mining effort is not
even in an individual’s medical record, either because a
doctor never asked for it, or because a patient would
never even be aware of what might be useful.
But two considerations militate against despair.
First, the potential payoffs of surmounting them are
more than proportionate to the effort. The McKinsey
Global Institute estimates that mobilizing health care
information could yield more than $300 billion a year
in additional value, or almost $1,000 a year for every
person in the United States. Of these sums, at least
two-thirds would take the form of reduced national
spending on health care.26 If even a fraction of that
unlocked value could be returned to providers and
patients, they would have strong incentives to join the
data revolution.
The push for “open data” is often gauzy and
rhetoric-driven. There are some clear directions to
take: polling patients to determine if their medicines
work or not, and then mapping those answers to
genetic variations to detect correlations. The results
can help cut reimbursement costs for drugs whose
effectiveness can be predicted, in advance, as less
likely to work for a given patient population. This is
simply one of many potential cost savings from
opening up data.
Second, sweeping reforms are not the only way
forward. Incremental improvements, we believe, can
make a significant difference, because benefits of data
sharing can begin to flow before the whole health
care system is networked. Similar to attempts to
overhaul technical networks, asking vendors to throw
everything out to adopt an ostensibly “perfect” new

21

Valuing Health Care: Improving Productivity and Quality

22

interpretation, and monetization—but of data
related to music, social media, and advertising.
We must draw on their talents and their investors,
and induce them to enter the health care arena by
providing “bait” in the form of large, well-formatted,
low-transaction-cost pipelines full of data.
How, then, can incentives be rebalanced to
make data entrepreneurship attractive in American
health care? We believe that much can be done
through a combination of reducing and circumventing
institutional obstacles.

Consent You Carry Around
One major obstacle is the elaborate system of
informed consent protocols for research on human
subjects. The kinds of safeguards that make sense
in the context of, say, drug trials and other forms
of research on people often are unnecessary and
counterproductive in the context of research on data.
In particular, patients and other research
subjects currently are able to give their consent to
be studied in only a single research venture or at a
particular venue. Consent attaches to the research
project or site, not to, as it were, the person granting
consent. Outside the boundaries of any given study,
or after that study is completed, further research on
the study’s subjects is nearly always off limits. As a
result, study populations are incredibly expensive
to assemble, in one-off fashion, and typically
impossible to integrate with other data collected
by other scientists. This blocks the reuse and
repurposing of information that is commonplace in
other parts of the economy and society. Indeed, the
great irony is that the health care sector is one of the
only places where this kind of integration is prevented.

For an analogy, imagine that supermarkets could
collect purchase data only for individuals who gave
advance approval to do narrowly targeted research.
Instead of sweeping up all your purchase data
automatically, you and a few dozen other shoppers
might be asked, when you entered the store, if you
would be willing to have your produce purchases
tracked that day. Then you might be asked to read
and sign an off-putting consent form. Your purchasing
behavior at other stores, or in the same store a few
months from now, or how your produce purchases
interact with your beverage selections—all of that
might be beyond the purview of the study. No doubt,
retailers could glean valuable insights from this kind of
targeted research, but the larger flows of information
they need to make efficient inventory decisions would
be nearly impossible to gather.
Retailers have discovered a better way. By opting
in for club cards and other preferred-buyer programs,
many shoppers give what amounts to portable
informed consent. That is, permission to use data
attaches to the shopper, not the study. And there
isn’t a law that blocks it.
Chemotherapy treatments are, of course, far
more personally sensitive than cat food purchases.
Yet, the same broad principle applies: an important
step toward reducing the costs of health data
entrepreneurship is to allow members of the public—
health care users and the general public—to
pre-approve the anonymized use of health and
lifestyle data about themselves for purposes of
broad, non-individuated research.
As of now, a well-defined legal regime for
portable informed consent has yet to be developed,
though there are a few projects expected to launch in
2012. It likely will take a series of pilot programs and

Health Information, Not Health Care
Rules and technology can go a long way toward
protecting anonymity. But they won’t be perfect. No
technology or penalty will be sufficiently robust to
prevent all determined data crunchers from ever
identifying individuals. And the special sensitivities
pertaining to information gathered by physicians

and hospitals cannot and should not be eliminated.
How, then, can privacy concerns specific to the
practice of medicine be squared with the need to
provide far more data available to enterprising (and
sometimes nosey) data miners? An important part of
the answer, we think, lies in circumventing a second
obstacle: the health care delivery system itself.
This may sound counterintuitive. Where, after all,
could one conduct health care research except inside
the health care system? That is where the doctors
and patients are, it is where the care is delivered, and
where the diagnoses and prescriptions are made. And
it is, of course, where medical research has gone on
until now.
In fact, however, the health care system is in
critical ways a particularly bad place for health care
data collection, for several reasons. One is simply that
it is organized for treatment, not for collecting data
and putting it in usable forms. The forms that
patients fill out in doctors’ offices are designed to
help providers understand the patient’s clinical
situation, not to build a broadly cross-referenced
dataset including variables, such as lifestyle choices
and family history, which may have no bearing on
the treatment at hand. Even if the forms they have
patients fill out were designed for easy upload, which
of course they are not, health care providers are not
paid or trained as data collectors.
Another reason is that, apart from an occasional
clinical study, the medical system gathers information
only when people are in that system seeking care—
which is to say, when they think they are sick. A truly
powerful dataset would turn its searchlight on the
healthy population, helping to understand what it is
that makes and keeps people healthy, and not merely
what makes them sick.
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experimentation to learn the correct balance between
the privacy of patients, the uncertainty of the effects
of public health research, and the technological
capacity emerging to capture and integrate personal
data. An important measure to move the ball forward
could be taken right now, however: the Department
of Health and Human Services could provide
regulatory air cover, so to speak, for pilot projects
by creating a safe harbor for experimentation. What
investigators need is simply some assurance that
learning what works will not result, later, in punitive
action by the government. If HHS does not believe
that it has this authority, it should request it from
Congress.
It bears repeating that pre-approved informed
consent applies to research on data, not on people.
Rules need to take all reasonable measures to prevent
researchers from identifying named individuals in the
database, something that can be avoided with
technologies that decouple data from names and
other individuating characteristics when data are
uploaded. Similarly, protocols need to penalize
efforts to identify individuals and target them with
marketing or fundraising pitches. There are currently
no penalties with which to punish researchers who
violate normative or contractual requests to avoid
re-identifying patients whose detailed, but
impersonalized, records are the basis of research.
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Yet another reason, and perhaps the most
important, is the privacy problem to which we just
alluded. Health care providers are culturally trained
and legally constrained to treat patient information
with maximum sensitivity. Providers and patients alike
have reason to be squeamish about uploading data to
a system whose security might be breached.
We believe current data-sharing rules within the
medical system are more overprotective than they
need to be. The consensus of the task force is that
health care data, suitably anonymized, should be
treated as a “public good”—something that
benefits society broadly and whose benefits cannot
be restricted to just a few. Some members of this
task force believe policy should be changed to allow
anonymized treatment data (for example, doctors
might upload data linking prescriptions to treatments
or ailments, but not to individuals) to be reported to
databases. Whether this would be automatic unless
patients request to opt out, or require patients to opt
in is up for debate. The position of allowing for
anonymous databases, however, is not a consensus
view either within our task force or in American
society. One potential interim step is to create safe
harbors for sharing and redistributing anonymous
data, which doesn’t carry names or Social Security
numbers but still hasn’t been so de-identified that the
data are rendered useless for research or prevent a
secure way to re-contact the patient for enrollment
in a clinical study or trial. Nonetheless, it probably will
take years to prepare the medical culture and privacy
laws such as HIPAA for thoroughgoing change.
An even more promising approach, we believe,
would circumvent the problems created by medical
records by collecting health data outside the medical

system. The potential here is vast; literally countless
organizations and venues can lend themselves to
easily and enthusiastically participate in data sourcing
efforts. The United States is host to 2,000 or more
nonprofit organizations that actively study and fight
diseases. Many of them would be natural partners in
an enterprising effort to build a national health
database. Employers could provide another nexus,
dispensing information for employees interested in
contributing to the understanding of disease and
wellness. This is more about observation of outcomes
“in the wild” than about the controlled, double-blind
studies that have formed the bedrock of clinical
practice for decades.
A current, highly successful example of collecting
data outside the health care system is provided by the
Army of Women, which is putting into practice the
scenario with which we began this chapter. Sponsored
by the Dr. Susan Love Research Foundation and the
Avon Foundation for Women, this project has since
2008 signed up over 350,000 women (out of a goal
of 1 million) to volunteer to participate in breast
cancer research; it then matches volunteers with
studies, sometimes quickly enough to populate entire
studies in a day or two. By contract, researchers agree
to share the data they develop with the Army of
Women, which thereby accumulates an ever-growing
database. Significantly, four-fifths of the women in the
Army’s volunteer pool are not current or former breast
cancer patients. It is, indeed, an army of women, not
an army of patients.
There are many advantages to collecting health
data outside the medical arena. Dedicated operations
are optimized for collecting data instead of treating
patients. Survey instruments are devised by experts
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or that of families and friends. When asked, people
often respond enthusiastically; a frequent complaint,
indeed, is that there is not enough research to
participate in. Privacy concerns are real, but
experience suggests that many, if not most, people
will be content with reasonable safeguards. Today’s
public is well accustomed to Facebook and, by and
large, understands that 100 percent privacy protection
is neither possible nor desirable. In the age of Google,
many view the health care system’s information
lockdown less as a protection than as an artificial
barrier to progress. So it is reasonable to hope for
quite high response rates from broadly representative
populations.27
In addition, statisticians can, to a large extent,
use sampling and other methods to control for
self-selected populations. And, even a self-selected
population contributing to a national health database
would be a vast improvement over what exists today.
If only, say, 5 percent of the population—or even just
1 percent or 2 percent of the population, a figure in
the low millions—were to connect themselves to an
information network, the resulting dataset would be
more than large enough to support an impressive
amount of important research. The explosion of data
entrepreneurs outside the health care sector means
that we have an enormous well of talent, experience,
and tools to draw on in normalizing the processing
and integration of vast and diverse datasets. If we can
make data available and connectable, the sheer size
of the health care market will draw the data analytics
talent toward it.
Which brings us to a final advantage of this
“outside of medicine” approach to collecting health
data, and a reason why we stress it as an example of
smart innovation in health care: it is practicable. No

 cautionary note, however: confidence would erode in the event of one or more major episodes in which identifiable health data were
A
leaked or stolen. Underlying this discussion of data gathering is the assumed premise that every reasonable precaution will be taken to
de-identify and protect data, so that, insofar as possible, individual identities are not known to the system.

Kauffman Task Force on Cost-Effective Health Care Innovation

who understand massive datasets and cast their
nets much more broadly than, say, physicians do.
The net effect is to ask better questions and to ask
them in a better way, so that results can be efficiently
compared and correlated. Nor is the population being
surveyed limited to the ill and others who are or were
“patients;” outside the medical system, survey
populations can include millions who, in any given
year, have no business with a doctor at all—and
whose wellness may be able to teach just as much
as others’ sickness.
Just as important, “information volunteers,” as
one might call those willing to be surveyed about
medical questions, can be tapped for new information
or follow-up questions as often as desired, not just
when (and if) they seek treatment. Online interviews
can easily be conducted for, say, fifteen minutes every
three months indefinitely, with questions automatically
tailored to participants. If the right question was not
asked in the past, it can be added next time. And, of
course, HIPAA and other medical-privacy rules do not
apply to information freely given by people outside
the context of medical treatment—a compelling
advantage of the non-medical approach.
One natural objection is that, in a voluntary
sample, data donors will self-select in ways that
skew the results. After all, not everyone will offer
information or respond to requests for it, whether out
of apathy, busyness, or privacy concerns. Responding
populations may therefore be unrepresentative of the
national population, the patient population, or both.
Self-selection, however, is not as big a problem
as it might appear on first blush. It turns out that
many Americans are quite happy, indeed positively
eager, to share health information in the cause of
improving research, which could improve their health
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liberals may wish for more federal activism, but the
size of government per se is not the issue here. Rather,
we point out that, in whatever role it assumes, the
government necessarily creates incentive structures.
On balance, those structures can and should be tilted
to break down research silos and encourage data
sharing rather than repressing it.

Meaningful information comes in nuggets;
data comes in sets. Individuals learn slowly; networks
can learn very fast. To turn information into data
and to link minds into networks, it is essential that
information be shared, not hoarded. Yet, at many
stages and in many ways, today’s health care
incentives encourage hoarding. At the level of patient
care, there are those aforementioned airtight privacy
rules. In commercial health care R&D, the process
of conducting drug trials and seeking patents
discourages public exposure of information that
may reveal failures or assist competitors. In academia,
tenure and promotion flow from publication and
citation of finished work; there is no reward for going
to the time and trouble to share the data that underlie
the finished work that may, especially when linked
with other datasets, reveal many valuable secrets.
To some extent the problem is cultural and
cannot be changed overnight. Yet, here, too, we
find promising incentive adjustments in the realm
of the adjacent possible.
Like it or not, the federal government is
knee-deep in the business of medical research,
through its own research, through its grants to
private researchers, through the Food and Drug
Administration’s oversight of drug approval, and
its support of higher education. Libertarians may
wish the government’s role were smaller, and

Silo-Busting at NIH
A place to begin is the National Institutes of
Health, an amalgam of twenty-seven research
centers which, together, spend more than $30
billion a year—half the entire world’s medical research
budget. Proposing reform of the NIH is something of
a cottage industry in the health policy world, and that
is not a subject we propose to cover here. In several
specific ways, however, the NIH can be a potential
catalyst for an information-sharing culture.
The so-called R01 grant, NIH’s mainstay form of
support for researchers, emerged decades ago, at a
time when research tended to focus on specific
diseases and fairly narrowly defined problems. If, as
much evidence suggests is the case, the marginal
productivity of medical research has declined over
the past few decades, that is partly because so much
of the low-hanging scientific fruit has been picked.
Meanwhile, the exponential rise of genome science
and the growing prevalence of chronic, multifactor
maladies have only made medical biology more
complicated, as more genetic targets and more
physiological systems clamor for attention.
A system, then, that relies heavily on grants
to only one or several investigators within a single
institution is bound to be less productive today than
in the 1950s and 1960s, when the archetypal

radical break with existing policy, nor any extensive
demolition of existing infrastructure, is needed. All
the tools and technologies are at hand. Converting
locked-in health information from a record-keeping
burden to a resource is, indeed, the adjacent possible.
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very little incentive to make available, in a digestible
form, the data that underlie the published research. If
anything, incentives flow more in the other direction:
to process and share data requires time and resources,
and it invites second-guessing. Data sharing allows for
more than merely checking prior research, important
although that is; it also allows subsequent research
to compile and use the original data in ways that the
original investigator could not have anticipated, and
to combine it into larger datasets that create still more
opportunities for discovery.
Here, again, part of the problem is a longembedded culture that prizes publication and
citation in the tenure and promotion process and
which places a particular premium on crediting
researchers for doing original work. The scramble for
priority fosters scientific competition between discrete
individuals and institutions, but impedes joining
forces across individual and institutional lines in large,
interdisciplinary efforts that rely on accumulating
and sifting data and attacking complex problems
from many directions.
Here, too, private organizations have shown
that incremental incentives make a difference. Many
private grantors require data sharing as a condition of
grant-making. This is an incentive structure that we
believe federal research funding—a major motivator in
the research market—should emulate. Indeed, making
the sharing of data, coupled with a requirement to
deposit the complete raw dataset plus the source code
for the analytical algorithms used to interpret, should
be the default expectation for federal funding. These
requirements would do more than any other single
measure, or possibly more than every other measure

R01-Equivalent grants: Average size. http://report.nih.gov/NIHDatabook/Charts/Default.aspx?chartId=158&catId=2.
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example of breakthrough medical research was the
lone researcher hunched over a microscope. Today,
making progress relies more than in the past on
cross-disciplinary teamwork: efforts that span multiple
investigators, and institutions, and disciplines. The unit
of research looks more like a network, so to speak,
and less like a pod. Yet, as one of our task force
noted, nearly 90 percent of the researchers who hold
R01 grants (and the R01-equivalent R23, R29, and
R37 activity codes) hold only one such grant, which,
in 2010, averaged roughly $400,000.28
Although much good work is done on the
traditional “let a thousand flowers bloom” model,
small, siloed grants are less and less adequate to
the task of assembling the broad skill sets needed
to tackle the problems before us. Many private
philanthropic funders of research understand this
team concept, and approve and fund grants
accordingly. NIH could and, we believe, should more
energetically steer its grant-making authority to
encourage cross-cutting research, with larger average
grants made available to larger teams, many of them
with participants from multiple institutions, and by
requiring data sharing across institutions. This change
would incentivize knowledge sharing at arguably the
very most critical stage, when questions are being
asked and research is taking shape.
The same imperative to break down silos and
combine minds from many disciplines also applies
to the publication of data and code after research
is published. Academic investigators have strong
incentives to publish good finished work, which is a
strength of the current U.S. medical research system.
At the same time, however, these researchers have
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medical literature has become so vast and complex
that no human mind or set of eyes can master even a
clinically relevant subsector of it. We need help from
computers, but we have made it impossible for
computers to get ready access.
A further important step is encouraging that
data be shared in an intelligent, digestible way.
Merely uploading data to a
Articles Publicly Available in PubMed Central
central location may be better
2,200,000
than nothing—technology
2,100,000
can do some of the work
2,000,000
of organizing data and
1,900,000
bridging variegated formats—
1,800,000
but far more valuable is to
1,700,000
reward not just quantity, but
1,600,000
quality, by encouraging the
1,500,000
sharing of manicured, “sushi1,400,000
grade” data that emphasizes
1,300,000
interoperability and ease of
MAR MAY JUL SEP NOV
JAN MAR MAY JUL SEP NOV
JAN MAR MAY JUL SEP
FY08
FY09
FY10
use. Standardization of data is
a huge concern for the possibility of medical research
Requiring that publicly funded data be shared
we talk about here, and for the use of electronic
in the same way is likely to be similarly effective. NIH
medical records, which we discuss in the next chapter.
already requires researchers receiving grants of more
31
Curating data and putting it in usable formats,
than $500,000 to submit plans to share their data.
though not hugely expensive, costs money, and not
Alas, compliance with the plan is not effectively
all researchers are adept at doing it. It would be
monitored. The time to do that, we believe, is when
helpful, we believe, if grants included some funding
grants come up for renewal.
for data scrubbing, whether performed by the original
Likewise, it is important to ensure that access to
researchers or by outside experts. The task force
the literature is seamless and not firewalled, so that
discussed the need for developing intelligent
machines, and not just humans, can access text.
computer programming scripts that could
So long as publications are walled in proprietary
automatically recompile data into a standardized,
databases and require human interfaces to enter
accepted format. There was not a consensus about
(e.g., passwords and logins), the immense power of
whether the federal government should take on this
semantic web, or even simple text-searching, cannot
role of developing the scripts and maintaining
be achieved. Yet, it has long been apparent that the
combined, to change the culture that treats data as
proprietary. When NIH began requiring that finished
research it funds be deposited in a public database,
compliance rose from 4 percent to 85 percent.29 As
shown in the chart below, this has had a dramatic
effect on the number of publicly available research
articles in the PubMed database.30
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Conversation with Neil M. Thakur, program manager for the NIH public access policy.
National Institutes of Health 2010 Office of Extramural Research Report, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/2010_oer_report.pdf.
31 National Institutes of Health. “Final NIH Statement on Sharing Research Data.” February 23, 2003. http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/noticefiles/not-od-03-032.html.
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30

Private Pathways to Data Sharing
In suggesting that the government use its
leverage to promote data sharing (and to help ensure
that shared data is of good quality), we do not mean
to suggest that there is no role for private efforts.
Some are already under way—still embryonic, to be
sure, but pointing the way toward a completely new
system of open-source medical discovery.
By way of example, consider Sage Bionetworks,
a nonprofit medical research organization whose
mission is not to conduct or finance new research, but
to create and link data depositories that promise to
let researchers work together in teams of hundreds or
thousands, not twos or even tens. Sage Bionetwork
projects include:
n A repository of genomic and disease-model
datasets, allowing researchers to efficiently query
a wide range of curated, collated data using an
interactive online tool.

n An online software platform creating a common
workspace for online research collaboration,
potentially allowing whole research communities
to self-organize online.
n A common data stream into which
pharmaceutical companies could pour
research data they feel they can safely share.
Early indications are that pharmaceutical firms
are eager to join such a data pool, because it
helps them eliminate duplicative research, a major
contributor to high drug development costs. (The
average pharmaceutical research target has five
companies working on it, each ignorant of the
others’ failures.) Better still, the data stream could
be opened to the outside world, “crowdsourcing”
discoveries that drug companies focused on
commercial products likely would miss.
n The provision of “priority review vouchers” for
companies that share all their failed trials data over
a multi-year period. Such PRVs have a predictable
cash value, can be traded and sold, and could
serve as easy rewards for sharing data.
n A project to help identify “non-responders,”
patients on whom expensive drugs would be
wasted or counterproductive. Three-fourths of
cancer patients are non-responders for any given
drug regime; much money and suffering could
be saved by finding clues that help rule out
ineffective treatments.
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standards, or whether a non-profit organization
should take the lead.
A challenge here is measuring the quality of
data in order to reward it. Fortunately, counting how
often data is downloaded, and thus how much use it
receives, is relatively straightforward and increasingly
easy. This is a measure to which, we believe, federal
grant-makers would do well to pay more attention.
Other metrics, which more precisely measure whether
data is reused in subsequent work (rather than merely
downloaded), are emerging; federal grantors should
encourage and adopt such indictors as their availability
and reliability grows.
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These projects and others like them, we think,
provide just a hint of the benefits that efficient,
large-scale data sharing may bring. Reducing the
regulatory and cultural obstacles to data sharing and
using government’s leverage to promote it should be
leading priorities for health policy.
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Lost in Translation: Making Knowledge
Count
The final stage of the data chain that turns
information into outcomes is to embody knowledge in
concrete treatments and protocols and make sure that
it reaches health care’s “street,” the practitioners and
patients on the front lines.
An important place to begin is in the area of
so-called translation, the process by which science
becomes clinical medicine. The U.S. medical
research system is strong on basic health research:
understanding the causes of disease at the molecular
level, for example, and finding potential targets for
treatment. It is weaker, and less systematic, at
translating basic knowledge into clinical applications.
Translating basic research into high-value treatments
does not happen automatically. Rather, it requires
embodying laboratory discoveries as usable drugs,
devices, and procedures; finding out if those new
methods really work in people (they usually don’t,
because human biology and culture are complicated
and ornery); and then disseminating and applying
that knowledge. Knowing a lot about how a molecule
affects a protein is of little help in bridging those
synapses; the translational stage often requires its
own kind of research.
32Francis

This is an area, fortunately, in which we are
not a voice in the wilderness. Francis Collins, the
NIH director, announced in 2011 the establishment
within NIH of a new National Center for Advancing
Translational Sciences, whose mission is to “catalyze
the development and testing of novel diagnostics
and therapeutics across a wide range of human
diseases and conditions.”32 Collins argues for a
“reengineering” of translational science akin to the
focused, coordinated approach brought to human
genomics a generation ago: “Little focused effort has
been devoted to the translational process itself as a
scientific problem amenable to innovation. As was
the case with genomics, translational science needs to
shift from a series of one-off solutions toward a more
comprehensive strategy.”33
We welcome this new translational emphasis.
The impact of a new center remains to be seen, but
Collins’s larger point is correct: translational research
needs to be viewed as a discipline in its own right,
supported by funding models that encourage
interdisciplinary, applied research, and nourished by
a stream of researchers trained for translation rather
than merely seconded from other disciplines. “The
triple frustrations of long timelines, steep costs, and
high failure rates bedevil the translational pathway,”
Collins correctly writes. “The average length of time
from target discovery to approval of a new drug
currently averages [approximately] 13 years, the
failure rate exceeds 95 percent, and the cost per
successful drug exceeds $1 billion, after adjusting
for all of the failures.”34 To date, the record suggests
an unfavorable international division of labor: the

S. Collins, “National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences: How Will It Work?” Presentation to Clinical Research Foundation
Annual Meeting, April 27, 2011. https://www.dtmi.duke.edu/website-administration/files/Collins%20NCATS%20slides.pdf. Accessed August
13, 2011.
33 “Reengineering Translational Science: The Time Is Right.” Science Translational Medicine, July 6, 2011. http://stm.sciencemag.org/
content/3/90/90cm17.full. Accessed August 13, 2011.
34 Ibid.

But Will It Cut Costs?
In most industries, new technologies and
discoveries tend to drive costs down, as competition
selects for innovations that increase productivity.
So far, unfortunately, health care has not worked
this way. For some of the reasons sketched in the
previous chapter—third-party payment, for example,
and the perceived necessity of the very “best”
treatment, regardless of cost—technological
innovation has been a major cause of health care
inflation. Often, generally adequate technologies
and drugs are replaced by successors that cost much
more but produce results that are little better.
Arguably, the single most fundamental problem in
the health care sector is the sad fact that innovation
and productivity have been at loggerheads, creating
a vicious cycle instead of a virtuous one.

Unlocking the power of modern techniques for
gathering, sharing, and analyzing data can encounter
the same problem. One can certainly imagine that
sifting through mountains of data on, say, breast
cancer or Parkinson’s disease might lead to expensive
new therapies with only marginal health benefits.
We believe that unleashing information will almost
invariably improve treatment. But will it also improve
productivity, the cost-effectiveness of treatment? That
is a very different question.
On the whole, we think the answer is yes.
“Informationizing” the health care system not only
brings to light new possibilities for research and
treatment, but also sheds light on the comparative
value of research and treatments. In other words, it
generates not just knowledge that allows providers
and patients to pursue better health; it also surfaces
knowledge that allows them to set better priorities,
focusing resources where they are more likely to
pay off.
That is why bringing the information
revolution to health care offers multiple benefits.
First, it will generate many innovations that improve
health outcomes. Second, it will generate some
innovations (new preventive measures and screening
regimens, for example) that reduce costs in absolute
terms, saving some money compared with the
status quo.
Of course, to gain the benefit of the
priority-setting knowledge that data networking
will uncover, Americans must set priorities. Alas, the
system is rife with political and institutional obstacles
to doing that, which brings us to the subject of the
next chapter: changing incentives to reduce waste.
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United States conducts the best basic medical
research, but other countries do better in applying
it—increasing their health competitiveness relative
to our own. And while the United States may
generate the most high-tech medical innovations,
other countries are better in applying low-tech
medicine. The effort to encourage translational efforts,
if anything, should be strengthened and accelerated.
More basic data “blocking and tackling” also is in
order. For difficult diseases, especially those that are
debilitating and life threatening, physicians should,
as a matter of course, use established protocols and
record medical information on standardized forms.
Electronic health care records, the benefits from which
we elsewhere stress not be overstated, nonetheless
can be useful in this regard. Once digitized and
standardized, patient data, disease status, and
treatment outcomes are much better positioned to
be analyzed.
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Harvesting Waste
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Rauch, “Turning Lights Down, and Profits Up.”
National Journal, April 20, 2007.

“Harvesting” waste? Don’t we mean “eliminating”
waste? Or at least “reducing” waste?
Yes, certainly. But a better way to begin than by
thinking of waste as a failure or a nuisance is as an
opportunity. Waste is a resource.
In the 1970s, many futurologists predicted that
the world would soon run short of vital natural
resources. Among the reasons they were wrong is
that they failed to appreciate the potential of waste.
In the United States, where the most accessible oil and
mineral deposits had long ago been exploited, copper
companies, for example, developed technology that
allowed them to go back to the mountains of tailings
and other waste they had left behind and re-mine them
for new copper. The oil industry developed directional
drilling, in-hole sensors, and other techniques that let
them recover new oil in old wells. Though some waste
is indeed a result of pernicious or pointless behavior (as
in “waste, fraud, and abuse”), much “waste” is better
thought of as a resource that we have yet to discover
how to exploit.
The bad news—and the good news—about the
health care system is that it is shot through with this
kind of waste. Once a company or entrepreneur
identifies waste and develops a way to eliminate or
reduce it, that company has, in effect, created a
new resource. Between 1997 and 2006, United
Technologies, an industrial manufacturer, set
ambitious goals to reduce energy use by taking
measures that ranged from recycling waste steam
to replacing light bulbs. It reduced its energy
consumption by 20 percent over ten years even as
its revenues more than doubled. The resulting
savings—$50 million a year in lower energy bills, and
$300 million a year less than if energy consumption
had grown in line with revenues—dropped straight
to the bottom line.35

What Is “Waste,” Anyway?
In economic jargon, waste can refer to
deadweight loss or opportunity cost. Deadweight
loss occurs when people engage in activity that
has no economic value or actually destroys value.
Opportunity cost occurs when people engage in
activity that has some value, but less value than a
more efficient use of resources would produce.
Health care offers many examples of both
kinds. Deadweight loss often occurs, for instance, as
a result of duplicative and pointless transactional
friction in billing practices. Some antiquated business
practices are not just suboptimal but lead to mistakes
and essentially throw providers’ and patients’ time
and energy out the window; illegibly scrawled and
inconveniently stored medical records come to mind.
The “dirty little secret” about the redundant medical
history forms that patients laboriously fill out every
time they visit the doctor, we were told, is that no
one reads them. Another widely cited source of
deadweight loss is litigation, which often yields
judgments only randomly related to either fairness or
deterrence of medical misbehavior.
Though deadweight loss is a serious problem
and obviously should be vigorously addressed, we
believe that still larger losses fall into the category
of opportunity cost, in the form of low-value care (a
more precise and compassionate term, we believe,
than “unnecessary” care). This is where the big
money lies, and it is here where the country will
need to drill in order to “bend the cost curve.” But
because low-value care is not always no-value care,
reducing it requires making choices that people will
resist. Low-value care brings us back to that familiar
health care dilemma: the knottiest problems stem not
from the system’s fault but its virtues, among which
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In health care, the problem is that savings from
reducing waste generally go straight to someone
else’s bottom line. Because of third-party payment
and government subvention, everyone in the system
(except, ultimately, the taxpayer) is in a position to
pass on costs, which means no one has a strong
incentive to reduce them. Doctors are not rewarded
for ordering fewer MRIs, hospitals for forgoing
unnecessary new beds, patients for declining
discretionary procedures, or insurance companies
for reducing paperwork. Not even the taxpayer is
necessarily rewarded for reducing health care costs,
since any savings may go back out the door as other
government spending. Where waste is concerned, the
low-hanging fruit still dangles unpicked on the trees.
Depressing though that may sound, the upside is,
of course, that there is an abundance of low-hanging
fruit to be picked. This is not to say it is easy pickings.
Repairing broken incentives requires diverting
resources from current beneficiaries and asking
providers and patients to make hard choices. If
that were easy, it would have been done already.
Nor do we harbor any illusions that efficiency can
turn around rising health costs any time soon; on
the cost front, the country is rowing against a strong
demographic current. But there are many billions
of dollars to be harvested even from modestly
incremental changes, and potentially trillions,
over time, from ambitious ones.
“Our health care system isn’t broken,” we
were told by one health care analyst: “it’s getting
exactly what it incentivizes.” In this chapter, we clarify
what we mean by waste, briefly assess some current
efforts to reduce it, and go on to draw attention, in
more detail, to ideas we believe deserve more
attention and development—all with an eye
toward improving incentives.
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is its reluctance to stint on any care that might
conceivably do any good.
We define low-value care as that which has a
relatively low probability of improving the quality or
quantity of life. Measuring quality and quantity of life
is difficult, but the concept of the “quality-adjusted
life year,” sometimes known as the QALY (“qualy”),
provides a productive way for analysts, if not the
general public, to think about it.36 Unfortunately, in
the rush to provide reassurance that health reform
would not bring about “death panels” or other forms
of cold-blooded rationing, the 2010 Affordable Care
Act (the health reform law) barred the government
from developing guidelines or policies based on
QALYs. Though we are not holding our breath, we
would hope for that ban to be overturned, because
the country cannot easily solve a problem that it
cannot openly think about.

Three Current Approaches:
An Assessment
Recent legislation and other policy initiatives
feature three prominent efforts to improve value in
health care delivery. We offer some descriptive and
evaluative comments here.

A. Comparative Effectiveness Research
The medical system generally knows if a
medication is safe and effective in controlled trials.
But it knows much less about comparative
effectiveness of drugs due to a dearth of head-tohead trials, even less about the effectiveness of drugs
in day-to-day use, as actually taken by patients. If a
drug is being prescribed but patients won’t take it,
because of inconvenience, or side effects, or for some

other reason, it is not effective. The same is true
of medical devices, surgical procedures, and
“off-label” drug uses, all of which receive less
(or no) pre-approval screening in the first place.
As reported by The Washington Post, the medical
research ecosystem has mostly failed to evaluate drugs
and devices after they reach the market:
	Only 1.5 percent of money spent on medical
research goes to “outcomes research,” of which
comparative effectiveness is a sub-category.
About 13,000 new clinical studies start up
each year; about 112,000 are running now.
A meticulous search in 2008 revealed only
689 studies that fit the general description of
“comparative effectiveness.” Many experts
believe that’s not enough.37
In an attempt to plug the gap, the 2009
economic stimulus package included more than
$1 billion for comparative effectiveness research, and
the Affordable Care Act established an independent
entity, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research
Institute, to help set priorities for effectiveness
comparisons and to provide a permanent stream
of funding.
We believe comparative effective research can be
a sound investment, and that the federal government
has an important role to play. Information about
effectiveness of various therapies is a public good,
and, for that reason, comparative effectiveness
research is likely to be under-funded if left solely
with the private sector.
At the same time, however, there are dangers
associated with having the federal government being
the sole actor in conducting comparative effective

generally, Peter Schuck and Richard Zeckhauser, Targeting in Social Programs: Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006).
37“‘Comparative Effectiveness Research’ Tackles Medicine’s Unanswered Questions,” August 16, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/comparative-effectiveness-research-tackles-medicines-unanswered-questions/2011/08/01/gIQA7RJSHJ_story.html.
36See,

unlooked-for knowledge is so important. Much of the
best comparative effectiveness research can be done
in the wild, not in experimental settings, by capturing
data currently lost in the system.
Value-driven Engineering (VdE) can be an
important complement to CER. Whereas CER
compares (by definition) the effectiveness against
standard or best care of a given product or
service whose production costs already have been
incurred, VdE seeks to optimize savings and care for
patient and the health care system through better
design, development, and manufacturing of new
pharmaceuticals, and the delivery of health care. In
effect, with VdE, the health care system is treated
as an engineering challenge focused on solving the
problems with greatest medical payoffs. With VdE
principles incorporated in the regulatory approval
and reimbursement processes, less money would be
spent on me-too drug research, which would reduce
the numbers of drugs pursued and the money spent
on them.38

B. Electronic Medical Records
Only a minority of physicians and hospitals
maintain comprehensive information-technology
systems. As any patient who has been told to fax an
insurance preauthorization or put X-rays in the mail
can attest, the need to bring medical information
technology into the current century is dire. Like
everyone else, we support it in principle. But we also
urge caution about what to expect from it.
In our view, the principal virtues of electronic
records lie in the realm of improving service, not
reducing cost. When records travel electronically with
patients, or are shared automatically with multiple
doctors, communication and coordination will be

a more detailed explanation of VdE, see Austen BioInnovation Institute in Akron, Value-driven Engineering for Global Competitiveness:
A Call for a National Platform to Advance Value-driven Engineering, June 2011. Task Force Member Frank Douglas is the chair of the steering
committee that produced this report and developed the VdE concept.
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analysis. This is because the government, through its
Medicare program in particular, can have out-sized
impacts on private sector practices potentially before
definitive results are in. New therapies and procedures
take time to be perfected and evaluated, and, if
judgments about their cost-effectiveness are made too
soon, many potential breakthroughs may not be paid
for. If payments are not forthcoming, then innovators
won’t try innovating in the first place.
In contrast, at least in principle, with multiple
parties evaluating the cost-effectiveness of medical
procedures, the market can help determine what gets
reimbursed and what does not. The problem is that,
because of free riding, no private sector actors may
want to get involved in the comparative effectiveness
business. One possible solution could be to have the
government provide partial funding of multiple health
insurers and/or providers to conduct these studies. But
even then, once the government picks one particular
set of results for any particular condition for purposes
of reimbursement, that decision alone can drive
reimbursement decisions by private actors.
In the end, we see no perfect solution to the
potential downsides to full or partial government
funding of CER. The upsides of publicly financed CER
are sufficiently great, in our view, that they are likely
to more than offset the downsides.
In any event, research can only be as good as
the data it is based upon, and traditional clincal
research can only do a piece of the job. Just as
important, if not more so, is the “big data” approach
that tells us what is going on in the real world. That
is why—reinforcing the message of the previous
chapter—it is so important to mobilize and share data
on a far wider scale than in the past, and why the
role of “data entrepreneurs” in mining databases for
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smoother. When software “knows” which
medications a patient is using and automatically
alerts doctors to potential conflicts, or when it
flags inconsistent instructions, it can help prevent
medical error. By integrating billing and other
back-office processes with medical functions, IT can
improve workflow. Not least, getting paperwork
hassles out of patients’ faces can improve patients’
experiences.
Some electronic medical records advocates predict
large cost savings. In particular, by integrating medical
records with comparative effectiveness findings and
clinical recommendations, IT theoretically could
automatically flag procedures that are out of line
with best practices or utilization rates that are
conspicuously high.
While we support the use of IT to nudge providers
toward better value (who wouldn’t?), we also caution
against expecting too much, too fast. Success stories
at particular institutions are all well and good, but
getting a multiplicity of proprietary and frequently
incompatible IT systems to talk to each other is a
challenge that will take years to resolve. In the short
term, the adoption of IT will likely raise costs, because
there is so much infrastructure to build and debugging
to do. Not least important, the power of IT to save
money will not actually be used that way unless
saving money is incentivized. For those reasons, a
long, sometimes bumpy, and probably expensive
transition period lies between the present and the
routine realization of the cost-saving integration that
electronic medical records seem to promise.
We do not mean to throw cold water on bringing
health records and administration into the digital
age, an idea which, to reiterate, we support and
which will eventually do much good. Continuing

contentedly with scribbled charts in file folders while
the rest of the world has moved on to Google Docs
would be absurd. We merely caution that electronic
medical records may be necessary but are far from
sufficient, and overhyping them risks diverting
attention and resources from other important tasks.

C. Accountable Care Organizations
The recognition that incentives need to
change has led to wide interest in accountable care
organizations (ACOs), which the Affordable Care Act
seeks to promote. In the traditional care model, what
providers provide is not accountability for a patient’s
overall health but individual procedures, each
separately coded and paid for—which is a bit like
buying a car one part at a time, without regard to
how it drives. Volume, not value, is rewarded.
ACOs are an effort to rewire these incentives
for at least part of the health care system. With
ACOs, the government pays networks of providers to
manage the health of at least 5,000 Medicare patients
for at least three years. If they do the job efficiently
and spend less than Medicare allots, they keep the
difference, provided they adhere to specified quality
standards.
The payment structure is designed to incentivize
cost-consciousness; the encouragement to form
large networks is designed to stimulate vertical
integration, so that providers will coordinate across
disciplines and work in teams; basing payment on
serving patients rather than delivering procedures is
designed to reward value rather than volume.
Together, those features are intended to seed what
some have called “mini-Mayos:” smaller versions of
the Mayo Clinic, a renowned health provider that is
considered a model of relatively efficient vertical
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Who Does What? Putting Doctors
in Their Place
As we have continued to stress, incremental
change is the only kind that will be effective and
sustainable in health care. That said, however, there is
room to consider fundamentals that existing reforms
may not do enough to address. Most fundamental of
all is a question rarely asked: Who needs doctors?
“Health care” is a rubric that today obscures as
much as it reveals. That wasn’t always the case. Years
ago, “health care” meant going to the hospital for
emergency treatment and to a primary care physician
(or a dentist) for almost everything else. In that world,
it made sense to think of medicine as synonymous
with doctors. That is no longer the case in today’s
world, with its proliferating specialization, complex
chronic conditions, and care delivery in settings
ranging from teaching hospitals to boutique clinics
and grocery stores.
Although we can imagine various ways to slice
the pie, we think it most useful to think of today’s
health care as comprising four related, but distinct,
categories of care:
n

Acute: care for urgent or unstable conditions,
or major interventions like surgery—generally
provided in hospital;

n

Chronic: ongoing care for stable or predictably
changing conditions;

n

Wellness: preventive and other measures to
keep people healthy—generally provided at home
and in the community; and

http://www.mayoclinic.org/about/facts.html.
Gold, “FAQ on ACOs: Accountable Care Organizations, Explained.” March 31, 2011. http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/
January/13/ACO-accountable-care-organization-FAQ.aspx. Accessed August 21, 2011.
41The ACC model is being tested through a planning grant from the Centers for Disease Control in the Akron, Ohio, area.
40Jenny
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integration and is popular with physicians and patients
alike. (The Clinic’s employed 3,700 physicians are
salaried and the system sees a million patients a year
in facilities in Arizona, Florida, and Minnesota.)39
Like everyone else, we look upon the
experiment with ACOs with curiosity and hope.
Reasonable expectations will help keep the
experiments on track. Near-term cost savings are likely
to be small. The government estimates that the health
reform law’s ACO initiative could save Medicare up to
$960 million in the first three years, or “far less than
1 percent of Medicare spending during that period,”
according to Kaiser Health News.40 And Mayo owes
its success at providing team-based care and vertical
integration not only to its structure but, perhaps even
more important, to its culture, which may be difficult
to replicate. Whether ACOs can foster cultural change
among their members remains an open question.
That said, no one really knows how much
money ACOs ultimately might save if they were to
catch on and if they are given incentives to continue
wringing out waste beyond the initial pilot programs.
Nor can we predict how much they might improve
upon today’s fragmented, often incoherent patient
experience—potentially a great deal, if they prove to
be an effective new paradigm. For that reason, we
hope that policymakers of both parties will continue
the ACO experiment for a sufficiently long period
to assess whether their promise is fulfilled. We
suggest similar efforts be made to experiment with a
related concept, the Accountable Care Community,
which focuses on patients, directing them to the
appropriate provider in their immediate community
to handle acute, chronic, or wellness problems.41
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n Integrative: oversight to ensure that the other
three categories gel to provide coherent care.
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In today’s system, physicians routinely are involved
in all four kinds of care. That was logical in the days
when most patients saw only one physician for all
their needs. Today, however, it means that too much
high-priced talent is devoted to tasks that could be
done just as well (or better) and much less expensively
by non-physicians.
We believe physicians should be lead providers of
acute and integrative care; that is, they should make
critical decisions when patients enter the medical
system with a new problem, they should supervise
and execute interventions until the patient is stable or
well, and they should bear ultimate responsibility for
(though not necessarily day-to-day management of)
ensuring that the overall treatment program is sound.
However, they should play a much more limited
role in delivering chronic and wellness care. Patients
who are managing stable and ongoing conditions
such as diabetes, chronic lung disease, or even chronic
heart disease generally do not need to see a doctor
unless there is some change in their conditions; nurse
practitioners or technical aides can evaluate them and
provide such services as blood and pulmonary function
tests, health coaching, and routine monitoring.
The potential savings from concentrating
physicians where they really make a difference are
large. The health care system is built for accidents
and emergencies, yet more than 75 percent of U.S.
health care spending is on chronic disease and its
complications.42
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After many decades in which “go see the doctor”
was the automatic injunction for anyone who
needed any kind of medical services, making patients
comfortable with the idea of seeing the nurse
practitioner, or even a health coach or nutritionist
instead, will require a cultural change. Fortunately, the
change is already under way. MinuteClinics, where
people can get routine lab tests, vaccinations, and
treatment for minor wounds and infections, have
sprung up in CVS Pharmacy and Walgreens stores
around the country; care is provided by nurse
practitioners and physician assistants, and clinics
often are open on weekends.43 RediClinic, a smaller
but similar outfit, operates in more than forty H-E-B
grocery stores in Texas.44 Overall, according to the
Convenient Care Association, more than 1,200 such
clinics operate in thirty-five states.45
Although still a drop in the bucket, the growing
popularity of the nurse practitioner model suggests
consumers are receptive to user-friendly care in
con-venient locations. Moreover, many practitioners
welcome being freed to do more of what they do
best. As one physician told us, most cardiologists
do not particularly want to be responsible for
administering maintenance doses of statin
medications or supervising weight loss, and
they aren’t particularly good at it.
Even for emergency care, cheaper but no less
effective alternatives to high-cost medicine at
hospitals are emerging. Urgent-care clinics are
beginning to spring up around the nation to provide
acute care for a wide variety of non-life threatening
accidents (cuts, broken bones, and the like) and
illnesses (e.g., strep throat).46 Health insurance plans

http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/publications/AAG/chronic.htm.
http://www.minuteclinic.com/about/history.aspx and http://www.minuteclinic.com/about/pressrelease.aspx?num=132, accessed August 19,
2011.
44http://www.rediclinic.com/news/opening_20_clinics_12-2010.php and http://www.rediclinic.com/faq.php, accessed August 19, 2011.
45 http://www.ccaclinics.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=11.
46Laura Landro, “At the Mall: New Clinics Let Patients Skip the ER: The Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2011, p. D1.
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What Do They Do? Incentivizing Value
According to the Congressional Budget Office,
around $700 billion, or one-third of annual health
care spending in America, is of the low-value variety
(“some, if not much, of it entirely unnecessary”).48
Dollar figures, however, mask an assortment of
oft-difficult questions and judgments. When we
talk about reducing the utilization of low-value care,
we are really asking: What care should the system
provide? And what should it not provide?
To see how best to answer those questions,
it may be helpful to distinguish two meanings of
“low-value,” one absolute, the other relative.
To say a treatment is of low value in absolute
terms is to judge that the improvement it purports

to offer just isn’t very helpful (perhaps a CT for
abdominal pain after an emergency doctor has already
diagnosed appendicitis on the basis of a clinical exam)
or unlikely to be beneficial (various species of back
surgery). But judging value in absolute terms presents
fraught choices and implies, to the public, valuing
some people’s lives or wellbeing more than others’.
We believe such value judgments are both inevitable
and, in real life, common, even if most people
prefer to look the other way. But we recognize their
inherently contentious and painful nature. We think
the most politically palatable path toward making
better absolute-value choices for many types of care,
particularly elective surgeries and tests, is to place
more such decisions in front of patients themselves,
a point we will explore in the next chapter.
To say a treatment is of low value in relative terms
is to say that there is a better or cheaper way to do
it. Judgments of relative value, though still not easy,
are less fraught. Most people would rather do things
in better or cheaper ways when given the choice,
provided they have a financial stake in the decision.
Additionally, determinations of relative value often
can be made by physicians and other health
professionals in ways that are not transparent to
patients. (The doctor, not the patient, decides whether
to order a CT scan or make do with an X-ray.)
Two categories of (relatively) low-value care
are particularly problematic, in our view. The first is
elective or preference-sensitive procedures and tests.49
This might include a joint replacement, much cosmetic
surgery, and, indeed, some cardiac interventions. U.S.
regions vary up to tenfold in their elective-treatment
rates, a variability too large to be explained by

See Schuck and Zeckhauser (2006).
Peter Orszag, Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Budget, “Increasing the Value of Federal Spending on
Health Care,” July 16, 2008, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/95xx/doc9563/07-16-HealthReform.pdf.
49 See J.E. Wennberg, E.S. Fisher, and J.S. Skinner, “Geography and the Debate over Medicare Reform.” Health Affairs, Jul-Dec 2002; Suppl Web
Exclusives: W96-114.
47
48
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can encourage the patronage of these facilities
through lower copays, thereby freeing up already
crowded hospital emergency rooms for the treatment
of more serious conditions.
More could and, we believe, should be done to
free the system to redeploy doctors. One step is to
reform state licensing restrictions to allow nurse
practitioners and other non-physicians to do more.
Another is to change Medicare reimbursement rules
to pay for treatments by nurse practitioners. The ACO
model may be another way to encourage providers
to use allied health professionals such as nurses to
greater effect (if an ACO can employ a nurse in a
doctor’s place it will save money and reap the reward
of shared savings in the program). Still another idea
is to encourage individuals to establish directives for
end-of-life decisions, which would reduce use of
physicians and other medical resources.47
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illness rates or patient preferences.50 So what accounts
for the variation? “Who you see is what you get,”
as one analyst told us: the choice of elective care is
highly sensitive to physicians’ recommendations,
and physicians tend to follow the practices of their
nearby peers. If everyone else is recommending spinal
fusion for uncomplicated low back pain, and cardiac
catheterization for low-risk patients, then I should,
too. This is herd instinct, not science.
Moreover, many patients get care that the best
current guidelines suggest is inappropriate for them.51
Twelve percent or so of angioplasties, stents, and
angiograms are inconsistent with accepted guidelines,
yet Medicare pays for them. It also pays for the use
of drugs against FDA guidelines, such as Avastin® for
breast cancer.
A second problematic category is supply-sensitive
care. Especially common in routine care of the
chronically ill, this is care whose utilization depends
in some significant measure on the availability of
providers and equipment—all of which generate
income when put to use. Rates at which patients see
physicians, are admitted into the hospital, or receive
tests (such as CTs) vary between regions and hospitals
by a factor of two to three.
The decision to hospitalize—a quite expensive
decision—deserves particular attention. What
determines whether you get sent to the hospital?
In non-acute cases, not science: scientific guidelines
on when to hospitalize are next to nonexistent. The
decision to hospitalize is entirely discretionary, and
doctors are influenced by the supply of medical
resources and the practice patterns they see around
them—which, of course, are influenced by the
resource supply. Other things being equal, more

hospital beds translate into more hospitalization.52
In principle, comparative effectiveness research
and propagation of best-practices guidelines can
help reduce the incidence of low-value care over the
medium and long term, but will not eliminate it. What
might do even more in the short run, however, is to
use Medicare’s payment leverage to encourage more
focus on high value. For example, Medicare should
not pay to use drugs in ways the FDA deems
ineffective, or to support treatments regarded as
inappropriate by standard guidelines. Medicare could
help curb the uncontrolled expansion of health care
system capacity (more beds, more doctors, which
leads to more spending) by penalizing hospitals and
organizations whose high capacity and cost make
them outliers. This would help break the cycle of
oversupply that creates its own demand. Medicare
might tell hospitals whose per-capita delivery of
end-of-life care (some of which is of marginal utility
to patients, at best, and probably no-value at worst) is
in, say, the top 5 percent, that they cannot receive any
more in total payments than they did in the prior year.
Discouraging outliers would force them, and the bond
markets, to reconsider the use of capacity construction
as a cash cow.

What Are We Paying For?
Buying Outcomes
For many health care experts, the holy grail of
payment reform is to pay for health outputs, not
inputs: that is, to reimburse for value, not volume.
Payments to providers should, it’s widely agreed, be
based not on how many procedures they perform, but
on how much patients’ health and wellbeing improve.
The movement for accountable care organizations,

S. Brownlee, et al. “Improving Patient Decision-Making in Health Care: A 2011 Dartmouth Atlas Report Highlighting Minnesota, Dartmouth
Atlas Project, February 24, 2011, www.dartmouthatlas.org/publications/reports.aspx.
51 P.S. Chan, et al. “Appropriateness of Percutaneous Coronary Intervention,” JAMA, 2011, July 6: 306(1): 53–61.
52 John E. Wennberg, Tracking Medicine: A Researcher’s Quest to Understand Health Care (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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Where Are the Barriers? Getting Law
and Regulation Right
Moving from fee-for-service to fee-for-value will
take years, if not decades. In the nearer term, a good
place to harvest waste is by removing or reforming
legal and regulatory obstacles that, in effect,
encourage nonproductive behavior. There are many

to consider, far more than could fit within the
compass of this paper, so we choose to focus on
three possibilities.

A. Medical Malpractice Reform
The medical malpractice system is hardly new
to the health care reform agenda. Physicians and
politicians have been up in arms about it for decades.
Some states have made important reforms, largely by
capping damages for “non-economic” losses (pain
and suffering), but progress is fitful because the
politics are contentious and opposition from the trial
bar is strong. Furthermore, the threat of liability, if
focused correctly on the truly negligent cases, can
be an important device for reducing physician errors.
Nonetheless, we believe malpractice reform is worth
pursuing, because the current system is both
ineffective and excessively expensive.
Ineffective, because malpractice lawsuits
frequently are driven by dissatisfaction with the
doctor-patient relationship—that is, with patients’
anger at their doctors, justified or not—rather than
by any objective nexus between a bad outcome and
malfeasance.55 In medicine, after all, bad outcomes
happen all the time, even when physicians do their
jobs well. Patients, jurors, and judges generally lack
the expertise to evaluate medical decision-making,
the incentive to do so with detachment, or both. The
result is that damages are awarded little better than
randomly. Many awards flow to patients who were
not, in fact, victims of malpractice, while most
victims of malpractice never sue and thus are not
compensated.

S ee, e.g., Jane Hyatt Thorpe and Chris Weiser, “Medicare Quality Measurement and Reporting Programs,” February 9, 2011. Published by
Health Reform GPS, a project of George Washington University’s Hirsh Health Law and Policy Program and the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation. http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/medicare-quality-measurement-and-reporting-programs/ Accessed Aug. 20, 2011.
54 Jane Hyatt Thorpe and Chris Weiser, “Medicare Value-Based Purchasing Programs,” March 30, 2011. Published by HealthReformGPS, a
project of George Washington University’s Hirsh Health Law and Policy Program and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. http://healthreformgps.org/resources/medicare-value-based-purchasing-programs/. Accessed Aug. 20, 2011.
55 Beth Huntington and Nettie Kuhn. “Communication gaffes: a root cause of malpractice claims.” Proc (Bayl Univ Med Cent). 2003 Apr;16(2):
157–161; discussion 161. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16278732.
53

Kauffman Task Force on Cost-Effective Health Care Innovation

discussed above, is a variation on that theme; ACOs
are paid to treat patients, not administer procedures,
and they pocket any gains they find by improving
value—so that, in effect, they are being incentivized to
improve the ratio of outputs to inputs.
We also support other, more direct methods to
change to an outcomes-based payment system, and
here, too, incremental change—albeit, in this case,
too incremental—is already under way. Policymakers
have been nudging Medicare providers to measure
value-added since at least 2003.53 The 2010 health
care reform legislation added provisions that not
only measure value but reward it: for example, a
“value-based purchasing program,” which directs
Medicare incentive payments to hospitals that meet
certain performance standards.54
Expectations should be limited; moving a
behemoth like Medicare is like steering the
proverbial aircraft carrier, except with many
competing hands on the steering wheel. But the
principle of purchasing value is gaining traction,
and Medicare is the right policy lever to use. And
there is considerable “low-hanging fruit” to be
harvested by substituting more cost-effective drugs
and therapies for less-effective ones.
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Malpractice litigation is expensive, because
soaring malpractice insurance premiums flow through
to the public by way of higher provider charges,
and because fear of lawsuits encourages physicians
to overprovide care. Estimates of the cost and
pervasiveness of so-called defensive medicine vary
(and are not terribly reliable) but are non-trivial. One
2010 study found that the medical liability cost was
about $56 billion a year in 2008 dollars, or about 2.4
percent of total health care spending, of which $46
billion, or more than 80 percent, resulted from
defensive medicine.56
A number of directions have been proposed for
reform, and, in truth, we believe any of them, or
some combination, would be preferable to the status
quo. One approach would recognize medical error
and bad outcomes as facts of life and would set up
a compensation system outside of the courts, with
expert evaluators providing payments based on fee
schedules. Under such a “no-fault” approach, more
people would be compensated, compensation would
be more closely linked to science, and the process
would be more predictable and less scary for doctors
and patients alike.57 Not least important, the
doctor-patient relationship may improve when
physicians feel they can apologize to patients
without teeing up a lawsuit. One disadvantage,
however, would likely be higher, rather than lower,
cost, precisely because more compensation would
be delivered. Another is the political difficulty of
creating what amounts to a whole new kind of
adjudication system, which would need to be built
and debugged from scratch—not, in our judgment,
the most realistic of prospects.
A second approach, although more modest, is

demonstrably workable inasmuch as some states are
trying it: change the liability rules. When Texas capped
noneconomic damages, the dollars flowing through
the state’s medical tort system substantially dried up,
partly because fewer cases were brought and partly
because damage awards were lower, according to
task force member David Hyman. Although pain and
suffering are real and deserve sympathy (and perhaps
payment, if jury discretion can be limited), they are
impossible to quantify in any consistent or objective
way, while their deterrent function continues to be
the subject of vigorous debate. Another liability
reform is to eliminate punitive damages, which are
inappropriate for medical malpractice and invite
incensed jurors to levy damages out of proportion
to reason. Their only legitimate function is to deter
deliberate misbehavior or negligence—which is not a
serious problem with physicians, and not a deterrent
inasmuch as insurers, not doctors, pay the claims.
A third and, so far, promising approach is to
channel medical malpractice claims into special
“health courts” where the decision-makers are
former or retired physicians or other medical experts.58
Given the complex and highly specialized nature of
medicine, the notion of having real experts has much
appeal. The 2010 health care reform legislation
encourages pilot projects for health courts at the
state level. We endorse this idea as well as efforts to
evaluate the results.
One final reason to get on with malpractice
reform is to remove it from the agenda. It has hung
around for decades and has become something of a
mantra, which, frankly, distracts policymakers and the
public from the need for many other reforms. We are,
again, under no illusion that malpractice reform (or

 ichelle M. Mello, Amitabh Chandra, Atul A. Gawande, and David M. Studdert, “National Costs of the Medical Liability System.” Health
M
Affairs, September 2010. http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/9/1569.abstract. See also http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/09/07/howmuch-does-defensive-medicine-cost-one-study-says-46-billion/.
57 The no-fault approach has been adopted by New Zealand. See Peter H. Schuck (2009), “Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style,” Yale Law & Policy Review.
58 This idea has been developed and actively promoted by Common Good, and its President and Founder, Phillip Howard.
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almost anything else in the world of health care)
is politically easy, but the sooner it is attended to,
the sooner the debate can move on.

C. Interim Drug and Device Approval
Another regulatory flaw, and one that is politically
easier to redress, puts a drag on innovation. Currently,
once a drug or device attains FDA approval, it goes
on the market without further scrutiny. Yet a drug is
completely safe only if it doesn’t do anything, and
even the most exhaustive clinical trials will not find all
the problems that may arise in real-world, large-scale
use. If a new drug causes bad reactions, the likely
result will be panic and a potentially crippling
legal assault on the company that made it. For
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B. Reform the “Medical Loss Ratio” Rule
The Affordable Care Act sought to reduce
the share of health insurance dollars flowing to
administrative overhead, but it went about the task
in a heavy-handed and arbitrary way. Depending on
the size of its coverage base, every health insurer must
spend at least 80 percent to 85 percent of premiums,
net of certain taxes, on medical care and specified
activities that improve quality (as opposed to
administration). The current average “medical
loss ratio” (medical payouts as a share of total
premiums), including estimated premiums for
employers’ self-funded plans, is around 87 percent;
the rule thus takes aim at inefficient insurers, or so
it hopes.
The approach is perverse, however. The loss
ratio rule encourages expenditures that increase
health care costs while discouraging insurer activities
and coverage designs, such as certain types of
utilization review and higher-deductible plans, that
could help reduce costs.
We believe the medical loss ratio rule is an
example of the kind of regulation that stifles
innovation on the business side of health care,
where innovation is almost as important as on the
medical side. But some regulation of the health
insurance industry—one of America’s least popular
and least trusted—is inevitable. We think there is an
opportunity here to reconceive incentives dynamically,
so that insurers have more incentives to innovate in
ways that lower costs.
The physician we mentioned earlier who bills for
four separate procedures every time he places an I.V.
does so because the current system provides no

incentives for insurers to reduce red tape. At times,
the system does just the opposite. The health
insurance industry’s name is a bit of a misnomer;
unlike, say, property and casualty insurance, it has
generally played a more modest role in managing
risk. Instead, much of the industry acts more like a
financial-services business, processing payments and
collecting fees. As with credit-card companies and
brokerages, the more transactions insurers process,
the more they earn (other things being equal).
Increased concern with cost growth by
employers and other customers, however, is helping
to encourage innovations that help manage risk.
With additional dynamic incentives, the insurance
industry, we believe, could become a powerful force
for modernization and innovation on the business
side of the health care business. It has more data
on medical utilization than any other player (except
Medicare) because most procedures and prescriptions
get billed through insurance companies. If the
industry were further encouraged to use its
knowledge base to predict and manage utilization
and costs, and if it worked with providers to do the
same, it could become a proactive source of new
productivity and much less of a passive conduit for
funding cost growth.
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pharmaceutical firms, putting a new medication or
device on the market can be a high-risk and costly
endeavor.
A better approach would be to allow interim
approval. During this stage, new drugs and devices
could be placed in the hands of physicians who
have been trained to handle them and who could
monitor the results. In exchange for putting new
technologies “on watch,” their developers would
receive protection from legal liability during the
probationary period, and some assurance of coverage
and reimbursement, with a share of sales proceeds
set aside for a fund to pay for compensatory care for
patients who have bad reactions. The result would
be to allow manufacturers and physicians to say to
patients, in effect, “try it, you’ll like it,” and to bring
innovations into the market at lower risk and
therefore, presumably, lower cost. That interim
approval would need to be accompanied by a
robust post-market surveillance effort that would
more rapidly weed out ineffective or dangerous
devices and drugs, thus speeding up the innovation
cycle by making room for better products.
Another attractive idea, outlined more than
a decade ago, is to provide conditional coverage
during the research phase for promising but expensive
interventions, provided that researchers contribute
data to studies that can evaluate risks, efficacy, and
cost-effectiveness.59

Rediscovering Diagnostics:
An Opportunity Renewed
We conclude with a point that shows how
the themes of the previous chapter (harnessing
information) and this one (harvesting waste) can
59
60

powerfully reinforce one another.
The graying of the Baby Boom generation
presents the country with a daunting health care
cost problem. Consider just cancer. According to the
National Cancer Institute, by 2020 the incidence of
malignancies in the population will rise by 20 percent
to 40 percent. If therapies are applied as at present,
the annual cost of treating cancer will rise from $124
billion today to more than $200 billion in 2020.60
A commonly cited floodwall against the rising
gray tide is to detect and treat diseases earlier, e.g.,
catching cancer before it metastasizes or invades.
Now, there is nothing new about prescribing
early diagnosis. In cancer treatment, it has been
a mantra for years—and it has often led to
over-diagnosis and over-treatment. Controversies
have dogged PSA screening for prostate cancer
and mammograms for breast cancer.
The story does not end there, however. The
advent of data-intensive medicine, discussed in the
previous chapter, along with quick and inexpensive
genomic profiling, suggests the prospect of a more
selective kind of diagnostic screening—or, rather, two
kinds. The first uses biomarkers to identify individuals
who are at elevated risk of developing particular
diseases. Rather than trying to screen the whole
population, over-diagnosing many and treating
all detected tumors based on gross statistical
probabilities, this form of diagnosis bases
screening and treatment on individual genomes
(individual genotyping), assessment of which genes
are turned on and off (gene expression profiling),
and granular probabilities based on studying genes
and proteins in tumors and tissues. With the use of
diagnostic biomarkers to detect pre-metastatic

H. J. Aaron and H. Gelband, eds. Extending Medicare Reimbursement in Clinical Trials. National Academy Press: Washington, D.C. 2000.
See, e.g., Angela B. Mariotto, K. Robin Yabroff, Yongwu Shao, Eric J. Feuer, and Martin L. Brown, “Projections of the Cost of Cancer Care in
the United States: 2010–2020,” Journal of the National Cancer Institute 2011:103, 117–128, http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/jnci/
press_releases/mariotto.pdf.

researchers to develop such diagnostics or for
clinicians to adopt them; in a fee-for-service system,
no one makes money by providing less care.
We believe the medical research system,
public and private, should invest more in
diagnostics relative to treatments. Medicare and
other government programs can encourage this
by making a point of making most diagnostics
reimbursable, just as treatments are.
There is a broader point here that relates to more
than just diagnostics. Two important opportunities
now present themselves. One is the advent of “big
data,” the availability of vast amounts of health
information which, combined with genomic profiling
and comparative effectiveness research, increasingly
allows diagnostics to find needles in haystacks, rather
than examining entire haystacks.
For example, as science marches on, the cost of
sequencing the whole genome eventually will come
close to the costs of conducting genetic tests for
just one or a few genes. Whole-genome sequencing
will provide an enormous amount of baseline data
that will become part of a person’s individual and
family history, which, together with lab tests, surely
will prove to be extremely valuable and life-extending
for many individuals. Put simply, the odds that, during
one’s life, genomic sequence data will prove to be
more valuable than several thousand dollars, the
current cost of obtaining it, have to be overwhelming.
Similarly, the emergence of value-driven payment
models is highly likely to make looking for medical
needles economically worthwhile. Combine this with
genomics sequencing, and surely we can develop
more effective diagnostics and use them more
efficiently than in the past. Through the still-misty
but unmistakably visible terrain ahead, we can surely
begin to see a path toward higher-value health care
that awaits us.
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carcinomas in high-risk individuals, cancers that
otherwise would develop into complicated and
frequently devastating cases often could be treated
by removing a tumor no larger than a centimeter.
According to Dr. George Poste, one of our task
force members, the ability to detect and diagnose
malignancies and to surgically remove them before
metastasis occurs would eliminate more than 80
percent of the rapidly escalating cost of cancer care.
Unfortunately, however, only about 3 percent of
public and private investment in cancer research
focuses on diagnostic biomarker technology, as
opposed to, say, searching for the latest drug.
A second form of test diagnoses not people’s
susceptibility to diseases but their responsiveness
to medications. Oncologists, as one expert told us,
too often “assault people with drugs they know
probably aren’t going to work.” Any particular drug
might work, but the odds are against it, so physicians
try one after another, a process that is both expensive
and physically and mentally exhausting for patients.
New diagnostics based on genome sequencing
and proteomics can help preemptively rule out
treatments that are likely to fail in particular patients.
To take just one example, KRAS testing—a test of
patients with colorectal carcinomas—can detect a
genetic mutation that renders patients unlikely to
respond to two first-line immunotherapies that block
a cell-surface receptor called EGFR. According to the
American Society of Clinical Oncology, if every
colorectal cancer patient were profiled with this test
on first diagnosis, the health care system would save
about $600 million a year; yet the adoption rate of
the test is only about 10 percent. Extending the same
technique through other altered molecular targets in
the same molecular pathways could exclude almost
80 percent of patients from getting ineffective drugs,
producing even more impressive savings. At present,
however, there is little economic incentive for
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Chapter four
Empowering Patients

If we come to the role of patients last, it is not
because they matter least. Quite the contrary.
Patients’ needs and decisions—how healthy or
sick they are, whether to see a doctor, whether to
accept medication, whether to risk an operation, and
so on—remain the most important determinants that
drive and steer health care decision-making. It also is,
perhaps, the most broken feature.
For all the time and money spent on them,
patients, or health care consumers (in some respects
a better term, because it includes able-bodied users
of preventive and other health services), often feel
marginalized—and, in important ways, they are.
Physicians tell them what to do; insurance companies
tell them what will be covered; employers tell them
who will be their insurer; and politicians make
policy in negotiations where consumers are the
least-organized voice at the table. Running the
gauntlet of specialists, and tests, and hospitals, and
offices, patients feel like mice in a maze of someone
else’s (or, worse, no one’s) devising, with little real
responsibility for or control over the system of which
they are part. There are few, if any, other sectors of
the private economy in which the end user has so little
influence over the product and its delivery.
That said, most people, though unhappy with
“the system,” are happy with their own doctors
and the care they personally receive. Most are
understandably conservative about change, which
is one reason the political system has been slow to
embrace some of the reforms we and others
advocate. Any reform that is presented as taking
something away from consumers will be greeted with
skepticism, if not outright hostility. This does not mean
never downsizing or retrenching; in today’s fierce
fiscal headwind, the country will have no choice but

Give Patients the Tools for Better Decisions
We begin with the most fundamental decision of
all: the decision to undergo treatment. We believe this
is one of the most promising and least appreciated
leverage points for making the system simultaneously
more humane and more productive.
From time immemorial, “Doctor’s orders” has
meant, “Gotta do it—no choice.” Although, in the
Internet age, patients often show up for medical
appointments seeking purported cures they saw
online, most people still look upon physicians as
authoritative experts. And, trust in doctors is a good
thing. As one physician told us, “The patient has to
think you’re God to let you cut them up.”
However, there is growing reason to doubt a
related assumption, which is that patients want all
the treatment doctors can throw at them, especially
if someone else is paying—or that they are too
confused to think about value. It is true, as opponents

of shifting more health care costs to patients like to
point out, that patients experiencing health crises
often are too frightened, bewildered, or ill-informed
to make hard medical decisions. Something can be
done about this.
About a third of health care is preferencesensitive. Such care is often called elective because
there is more than one way to treat the condition
and no treatment is often an option. In other words,
patients have a legitimate choice about the kind of
treatment they prefer to receive. Common examples
include treatment for early-stage prostate and breast
cancer; hip, knee, and spine osteoarthritis; chest pain
and stroke risk associated with arterial heart disease;
and so on.61 For early-stage prostate cancer, four or
five treatment pathways often are available. Or take
early-stage breast cancer. Women have a choice
between mastectomy, which involves the removal of
the entire breast, and lumpectomy, which involves
surgical excision of the tumor itself, with radiation
after surgery. Clinical evidence suggests that either
treatment offers women the same chances of survival.
What differs is the impact on an individual patient’s
sense of herself and her wellbeing—and that varies
from patient to patient.62
How do patients choose? Often they do as their
doctor recommends, which is one reason treatment
patterns vary so dramatically from region to region: as
we have seen, “who you see is what you (often) get,”
and doctors follow local practice patterns and market
signals. For example, a recent study by the Dartmouth
Atlas Project found that rates of mastectomy and a

B enjamin Moulton and Jaime S. King. Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice. Journal of Law,
Medicine & Ethics, Spring 2010. Moulton is a member of this task force.
62 Shannon Brownlee, Vanessa Hurley, and Ben Moulton, “Patient Decision Aids and Shared Decision Making,” Policy Brief (New America
Foundation Health Policy Program, September, 2011).
61
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to both shrink and trim. It does mean, wherever
possible, conceiving of and couching reforms in a
framework of giving to patients: giving more
information, more control, better success rates, and
a better experience. Offering them today’s experience
at a higher cost to themselves is a political loser, even
if it were a fair proposition.
In this chapter, we consider some ways in which
patients can add value to the system rather than just
consuming it, by being given tools and incentives to
make better decisions, share in productivity gains, and
take full ownership of their own information stream.
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number of common cardiac procedures, including
angioplasty and stents, varied ten-fold across hospital
referral regions.63 Such variation can be driven by a
single physician practice, as was the case in the city
of Elyria, Ohio, where one prominent group of
cardiologists drove the angioplasty rate for Medicare
patients to four times the national average.64
This high variation in rates of preference-sensitive
treatments has obvious implications both for medical
ethics and health care spending. In many cases,
however, patients receive (or feel they receive) too
little medical information to make an informed choice,
and still less guidance to help them understand and
act on their underlying values and preferences. As a
result, write Benjamin Moulton and Jaime S. King,
patients “adopt not only their physician’s treatment
choices, but also their physician’s values, levels of risk
aversion, and personal preferences.”65
That might be all right if doctors’
recommendations were reliable proxies for
patients’ preferences, or even if doctors could
reliably assess preference; but this is not the case.
Moreover, studies find that physicians tend to skew
their discussions toward emphasizing the benefits of
surgery and understating risks.66 As a result, clinical
evaluation research studies suggest that patients are
routinely asked to make decisions about treatment
choices in the face of what can only be described as
avoidable ignorance:
	In the absence of complete information,
individuals frequently opt for procedures they

would not otherwise choose. Mounting clinical
evaluative evidence suggests that the number
of surgical procedures performed, even when
justified by practice guidelines, actually exceeds
patients’ desires when they are fully informed
through a shared decision-making process.67
“Shared decision-making” refers to a budding
movement that converts what today is often the
patient’s rote signature on an (ironically named)
informed consent form into a guided dialogue
between patient and provider. The idea is to lay out
for the patient, and then help them work through,
the pluses and minuses of treatment options—in a
way that not only conveys medical information but
that also helps the patient understand and make value
choices about the relevant lifestyle implications and
risk-reward tradeoffs.
In one common model, a patient with early-stage
prostate cancer is provided with a video and a printed
guide giving a balanced discussion of the options,
including their likely benefits and risks; completes a
questionnaire helping providers to understand the
patient’s priorities and values and bringing to light
conflicting desires; and, with the resulting information
in hand, meets with doctors and other health
professionals who have been coached on the shared
decision-making process. One might think of the
process as informed consent raised to a higher
power: consent based not just on a yes-or-no
recommendation or on a one-size-fits-all summary of
medical evidence, but on a “more robust discussion,

S hannon Brownlee, et al., “Improving Patient Decision-Making in Health Care: A 2011 Dartmouth Atlas Report Highlighting Minnesota.”
Dartmouth Atlas Project, February 24, 2011. http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Decision_making_report_022411.pdf.
64 Reed Abelson, “Heart Procedure Is Off the Charts in an Ohio City.” New York Times, August 18, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/
business/18stent.html.
65 Moulton and King, p. 3.
66 Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher et al., The DECISIONS Study: A Nationwide Survey of United States Adults Regarding Nine Common Medical
Decisions.” Medical Decision Making, September-October 2010, 30(5 Suppl): 20S-34S. http://mdm.sagepub.com/content/30/5_suppl/20S.
abstract.
67 Moulton and King, p. 5, fn. 38.
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to properly inform patients of risks. The 2010
Affordable Care Act includes shared decision-making
among the innovations to be developed and
promoted by the Department of Health and Human
Services, though Congress failed to appropriate funds.
Gradually, support for the concept is building, and a
nascent infrastructure is taking shape.
Not least important—here returning to the
concept of absolute value that we broached in the
previous chapter—we also see shared decision-making
as a powerful, albeit partial, solution to health care’s
thorniest political problem. Who decides which care
is of low value in absolute terms? That is, which
care, and whose care, is just not worth the cost and
trouble? The public views efforts by politicians or
bureaucrats to make such judgments as “death
panels” or “rationing.” In contrast, a great advantage
of shared decision-making, we think, is that instead of
kicking absolute-value decisions upstairs to
politicians and insurers, it kicks them downstairs to
patients —who, it turns out, often will make sound
decisions about preference-sensitive care when given
sound information. Shared decision-making also
should be used for decisions around end-of-life care.
The edge of fear and the veil of ignorance, which
together skew decisions about medical value and
health-care values, need not be accepted as given.
For all of those reasons, we believe it is time to
move shared decision-making higher up the list of
health reform priorities. Policy should strive to move it
through the experimental stage and toward broader
adoption. The government’s new Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Innovation (created by the health reform

Ibid., p. 6.
A.M. O’Connor, et al. “Decision Aids for People Facing Health Treatment or Screening Decisions.” Cochrane Database System Rev. July 2009,
8(3): CD 001431.
70 The Lewin Group, “A Path to a High Performance U.S. Health System: Technical Documentation,” Figure 53 (February 2009).
71 Foundation for Informed Medical Decision Making, “Questions and Answers,” undated.
68
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which engages both the patient and the physician in
evaluating the patient’s medical goals and lifestyle
preferences to come to an informed choice.”68
The results are impressive. In a review of
eighty-six randomized controlled trials, patients given
decision aids were better informed about treatment
options. Studies found that using patient decision aids
improved knowledge of health care choices, increased
the proportion of patients with realistic perceptions
of benefits and harms, lowered decisional conflict,
reduced the number of patients who were passively
involved in decision-making, reduced the number of
patients undecided after counseling, and improved
alignment of patient values and health care options
chosen. Moreover, patients were 20 percent less likely,
on average, to choose the more invasive option—
with medical outcomes that were just as good.69 An
estimate by the Lewin Group in 2009 found that fully
implementing shared decision-making in the Medicare
population for eleven conditions that could be treated
with surgery could save Medicare $50 billion over ten
years (a benefit in addition to closer alignment with
informed patient preferences).70
We embrace shared decision-making because
it can help reduce utilization of low-value care and
because it is a better way of doing business—reasons
enough, to be sure. Furthermore, some places already
are proving it in practice. Clinical models delivering
shared decision-making have been funded in several
states.71 The state of Washington, for example,
created incentives for shared decision-making by
giving doctors who use it added protection from
lawsuits based on allegations that the physician failed
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law) should make a point of funding pilot programs in
every state; state legislatures should revise informed
consent laws to make shared decision-making the
gold standard of informed consent. Such measures are
no pipe dream: Washington state already has begun
to reform its informed consent statutes; Vermont and
Maine have pilots underway; Minnesota, Oklahoma,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire are considering
legislation. Still in the planning stages are private and
government-backed groups to evaluate and certify
decision aids (it is very important that these aids,
which can come in the form of a brochure, video, or
web-based guide, be clear, accurate, and free of bias
and merchandising).
We have no illusions that shared decision-making,
by itself, can bend the cost curve dramatically. In some
cases, more informed consumers may demand more
costly treatments. Moreover, in the long run, shared
decision-making can only supplement, rather than
substitute for, some difficult public-policy choices
about what government programs and private insurers
will and will not pay for. What it can do, however, is
take important steps toward letting the people who
know and care the most—patients—define and seek
value. And it can reduce the most egregious examples
of medical care departing from patient preference.

Giving Patients Pecuniary Incentives
to Find Value
This paper has returned time and again to the
theme of incentives. We have discussed the need to
rewire incentive structures to give providers and
insurers more reason to search for value, and more
rewards when they succeed. In our judgment, it is also
important to engage consumers in that quest.

In the long run, we think consumers will be
happier in a world where they have more influence
over the system and more control over their own care.
In the shorter term, however, asking consumers to
shoulder more of the burden of shopping and paying
for care is unlikely to feel like a gift. From a Medicare
patient’s point of view, what’s not to like about
going to see a doctor, ponying up a small copayment,
and thinking no more about it? The whole problem,
however, is that Medicare is eating the government’s
budget alive, and today’s sweet deal is eventually
going to go away. Given the available choices,
we think, policies that give patients more
responsibility and control over their health care
are likelier to sit better with the public in the long
run than are bureaucratic controls that further
reduce the patient’s perceived role and influence.
Until now, the usual way politicians have
thought about making patients more cost-sensitive
is to increase copayments for Medicare and other
consumer-borne costs. Employers have been
applying the same ratchet by passing on a growing
share of health insurance premiums to employees.
This kind of additional “skin in the game” succeeds
in shifting costs to consumers and, thus, deferring
the crunch on corporate and federal treasuries, but it
has not, to date, had a discernible impact on the cost
curve. Employees and Medicare recipients may reduce
their utilization marginally, but not by much, and what
they are most likely to cut back on, at least initially,
is preventive and routine care, the least costly kind,
and where short-term savings can cause long-term
expenditures. Today’s foregone vaccine is tomorrow’s
hospitalization for pneumonia. Marginally higher
copayments also are likely to have relatively little effect

n Increase cost transparency: provide patients
with more information about the underlying costs
to them (not some artificial bill submitted to an
insurance company) of the service with which they
are being provided—something which, today, they
usually cannot find out even if they try;
n Improve value transparency: provide patients
with more information about the relative
effectiveness of medical care—something that
is scarce today (you can find better and more
accessible information when choosing a car or
camera than when choosing a doctor or hospital);
n Create positive as well as negative incentives:
allow patients who discover value to pocket some
of the dollars they find.

Policymakers have made various efforts toward
embodying those goals. Health savings accounts,
for instance, let people set aside tax-favored funds
earmarked for health care and insurance and allow
people to keep what they don’t spend. It is too early,
however, to know how effective HSAs will be in
reducing cost without sacrificing care.
More far-reaching is a reform we believe is
inevitable, and which has had some bipartisan
support and heritage: converting government
health care assistance from its current fee-for-service
reimbursement model to one that pays for insurance
premiums. A “premium support” system, ideally one
whose support payments are determined progressively
(as incomes of recipients increase, their government
support payments decline), would permit households
to choose their health care insurance coverage
packages and providers, just as they do for other
forms of insurance now, and, in the process, let
individuals choose what kind of coverage they want
and what they are willing to pay for.72 The best role
for government is to assure the minimum amounts
of guaranteed coverage to individuals, especially for
catastrophic illnesses, but to do so without exposing
taxpayers to the runaway costs that currently are
embedded in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Government also may have a significant role
in encouraging price and value transparency. The
2010 reform steps in that direction by collecting
performance data on physicians who participate in
Medicare and then publishing it online, on a website
similar to the existing Hospital Compare and Nursing
Home Compare websites.73 As always, expectations
for reducing costs by such methods should be

Ideally, premium support payments also would be tied to regional variations in health care costs and to the health of the individual at the time
he or she is eligible for assistance.
73 2011 Economic Report of the President, p. 114.
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on the use of high-cost acute care and end-of-life
treatment when patients or their families tend to do
whatever it takes to resolve an immediate problem or
extend life.
More important, however, is this: raising
copayments a bit might give consumers a bit more
reason to look for value, but they also need to be
able to find it. If they don’t know how much care
costs, and if they don’t know what how much value
they are getting, and if, especially, they don’t share in
any upside from seeking value—in that case, raising
copayments may induce them to consume less, but it
will not induce them to consume better, which is even
more important.
What policymakers are looking for, then, are
measures that do one or more of these three things:
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realistically modest, especially at first. Evidence
suggests that, when patients shop for care, they first
consider quality and provider reputation, not cost.74
Still, we think additional increments of transparency
can only redound to the good.

the line between being overweight and obese is not a
clear one. Nor is it clear how to address the problem.
There is a high level of recidivism among even
temporarily successful dieters. While research
continues to identify and possibly modify the “obesity
genes,” those outcomes are still in the distant future.
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Up to this point in the chapter, we have
concentrated on how patients, perhaps encouraged
by monetary incentives, can take better charge of their
own health care. But patients’ need for health care
in the first instance is heavily influenced by their own
behaviors. Two of them come to mind: smoking and
obesity.
There is much stronger evidence and consensus
about the first than the second. The harsh physical toll
on those who smoke is now so well established that it
is difficult for the current generation of young adults
to imagine the world in which their parents (and their
parents) grew up, bombarded by advertising about
the joy of smoking and by the wide social acceptance
of the practice.
Although young people today are less likely to
take up smoking than their parents were, too many
American adults who already have begun (and larger
numbers outside the United States) find themselves
unable to quit. Here, too, various incentive schemes
may help. One particularly intriguing idea is for
smokers to commit to pay a third party if they fail to
quit.75 A related notion is for employers to pay their
employees to quit. Still another promising approach is
to bring peer pressure on smokers to quit in Alcoholics
Anonymous-like settings.
Obesity is more problematic. Though it has been
linked with a variety of ailments, notably diabetes,

Give Patients a Portal to the Data Stream
A final kind of patient empowerment allows us
to revisit an earlier theme: mobilizing data. What is
often overlooked is that, although people have a lot
of knowledge about their health and their experiences
with health care, they often do not own their
knowledge. Strange though it may seem, medical
records and samples typically belong to the health
provider, not the consumer.
That policy and others like it should be
reconsidered, with a default assumption being that
any information or sample collected from a health care
consumer belongs to the consumer, who can share it
as she pleases—for instance, by indicating proactively
to health providers that data is to be released for
comparative effectiveness studies and other research.
We have already discussed portable informed consent,
data collection outside of the medical system, and
other measures to let willing consumers more
easily share their knowledge and experience with
researchers and data entrepreneurs. We have yet
to discuss how to connect individuals to the river of
information and knowledge that will flow from their
uploads. A good way forward is with what we think
of as a “life certificate.”
At present, every American is issued a birth
certificate and, eventually, a death certificate. But,
between birth and death, little is done to catalog

S ee, e.g., Ha T. Tu and Johanna Lauer, “Word of Mouth and Physician Referrals Still Drive Health Care Provider Choice.” Center for Studying
Health System Change Research Brief No. 9, December 2008. http://hschange.org/CONTENT/1028/. Accessed August 24, 2011.
75 See Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff, Lifecycle Investing: A New, Safe, and Audacious Way to Improve the Performance of Your Retirement
Portfolio (Basic Books, 2010).
74

In the short run, a life certificate would help move
people and information through the system more
smoothly while preventing errors. But, over time,
something grander will be possible. Over time, the life
certificate would become, in effect, the consumer’s
passport to the health care datasphere that we
envisioned in Chapter Two. Think of it as his or her
portal to the health information “cloud.” Combined
with information harvested by data entrepreneurs
from billions of data points, and with knowledge
gleaned from genomic profiling, a swipe of the life
certificate could tell a physician—or a physician’s
assistant or nurse practitioner—a lot of what they
need to know about what ails the patient, or what
probably will ail him, and how (and how not) to treat
it, before they even set eyes on him.
Who would be tasked with creating and
maintaining this life certificate? We think the federal
government could help create a demand for it by
providing incentives for research and development of
the idea. Perhaps most important, participants should
be able to get any data generated about them.
Clearly, a variety of technical issues will need
to be worked out: encryption, portability, rules for
access, and so on—that is what the research and
development phase is for. But the main thing is to
establish a principle. The combination of consumers
who own, or at least are able to access, their own
health data suggests the potential for all kinds of
knowledge transactions, linking health consumers
not just to doctors but also to scholars, data
entrepreneurs, disease support groups, drug
developers, and many others. Though not a
replacement for the stethoscope, this passport to
the cloud promises ultimately to be far more
powerful an instrument.
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and standardize the large amounts of information
collected by medical providers, insurance companies,
schools, and other entities about people’s health and
medical histories—and much of what is collected is
not readily available to consumers themselves. Many
people, for example, have trouble recollecting which
vaccinations they received as children and when; or
never learn what type of stent was inserted; or may
recall as appendicitis what was, in fact, diverticulitis.
And what exactly was that medication they were on
thirteen years ago? In an emergency, some of this
information might make the difference between life
and death, and waiting hours or days to get it—the
time it can take to get in touch by phone or fax with
the right provider and pull the proper file—is, in
today’s world, ludicrous. Even in a non-emergency,
such information is a diagnostic boon, and asking
distracted, anxious patients to fill out forms in the
doctor’s waiting room is hardly an accurate or efficient
way to get it.
The “life certificate” is a bundle of standardized
health information that would travel around with
consumers and accumulate as they pass through
health-related gateways: vaccinations (up to date
for tetanus?), procedures (had a tonsillectomy?),
medications (which antibiotics?), family history (colon
polyps?), and so on. Importantly, the life certificate
would belong to the consumer, not the government
or providers, and would travel with the consumer.
Also importantly, the information would be uploaded
in a standardized, machine-readable format, so that
the life certificate could immediately “talk” to multiple
databases. With a patient’s consent, ideally opt-out
to ensure maximum coverage, information would be
added routinely by providers and, especially, by
insurers, who are billed for and therefore know about
most treatments that most people undergo.
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Chapter Five
Conclusion: Coping
with Complexity

Over the course of the meetings that laid the
groundwork for this report, a convergence developed.
On the one hand, we had clinicians and researchers
talking about the challenges of innovating in medical
science; on the other, economists, administrators,
and legal experts talking about the challenges of
innovating in health policy. Their two worlds meet,
of course, in the nexus between the hospital that
provides care and the insurer or government program
that pays for it. But they turned out to meet in a more
fundamental respect, which can be boiled down to
the word complexity.
A recurring theme among scientists in the
discussion was that medical biology is the hardest
of sciences. “If only it were as easy as rocket
science!” one task force member bemoaned.
Biology is hard because life is complex and adaptive;
laboratory biomedicine is harder still, because of the
incalculable variety of pathologies and treatments and
the even larger numbers of ways they can interact
with the body; clinical medicine is hardest of all,
because one must deal with human beings, the most
complex and unpredictable of creatures. True, the
twentieth century produced unprecedented medical
innovation, but most of the low-hanging fruits,
our biologists agreed, have been plucked. Today,
researchers find that almost nothing works in the
body as one expects from lab results, and not much
works at all. This is not to sound a note of gloom; it
is merely to acknowledge the reality that biomedicine
is hard.
An emergent theme among the policy wonks
was that health care is the hardest of policy areas. “If
only Medicare were as easy as Social Security!” was
a common refrain. Many policy areas need to deal

n N
 ew informational tools are coming on line.
Nothing like the data stream and the tools for
tapping into it that are now emerging has ever
been available for health care; in a sense, data
“microscopy” brings the cellular anatomy of the
health care system into view when, heretofore,
we had only the informational equivalent of the
naked eye.
n T
 here is wide agreement on the need to
reform incentives in fundamental ways.
In our group, there was no one, from any
discipline or sector, who defended traditional,
procedure-based fee-for-service and transactionmaximizing insurance as a sensible model for
medicine. Changing the incentives will be difficult
and gradual, but everyone acknowledges it needs
to happen.
n S
 evere fiscal pressure forces change. One way
and another, the economy and the political system
have managed until recently to find new money
to pour into the bottomless hole of fee-for-service
medicine, but this cannot go on forever. As the
late economist Herbert Stein used to say, what
cannot go on forever will stop. If health care costs
are not increasingly tethered to value, rather than
soaring ever upward simply because they can, the
system will crash. Indeed, it is in the midst of a
slow-motion crash already. This is painful, but with
the pain of crisis comes opportunity for change,
and this remains true even though health care
reform ostensibly was “solved” by the Affordable
Care Act.
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with tight resources and a fiscal crunch, which is hard;
some—public pensions, education, and others—
need to cope with periodic and sometimes severe
demographic pressures; a few (think of the federal
agricultural support programs) must cope with
markets that have been distorted by decades of
often-counterproductive government policy; and
a handful are simply so big that whenever they
sneeze, the entire government gets fiscal pneumonia
(Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security head this list).
But health policy poses all of those challenges at once,
and then some. As with health care, so with health
policy: interventions that seem likely to work in
principle often mysteriously fizzle amid the complexity
of the health care economy and the political
ecosystem in which it is embedded. It isn’t that
nothing works; only that figuring out what works
is hard, and getting it implemented can be harder.
Politics can make even biology look simple.
This is one reason we have tried to fix our gaze on
the adjacent possible: measures capable of producing
incremental gains even if adopted on a less-thangrandiose scale, while planting seeds for greater
progress in years ahead; measures re-channeling
incentives rather than swimming against their
currents; and measures that can be and preferably
are being tried, tested, and adopted or adapted. It
is also why we have tried to emphasize keeping
short-term and medium-term expectations realistic,
even while remaining inspired by the potential for
dramatic improvement in the long term.
We hope, though, that our approach does not
induce defeatism or pessimism. Neither is warranted.
Rather, our own feeling is one of guarded optimism,
based on factors such as:
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n T
 he availability of multiple incremental
paths forward. There is one respect in which
biomedicine and health policy are not alike: when
it comes to improving health care efficiency and
value, the trees are practically groaning with
low-hanging fruit. It may seem odd to draw
comfort from the pervasiveness of the current
system’s flaws, but in one sense we do. Fixing the
system is hard. Improving it is easy.
Health policy has never experienced the kind of
rapid advance that health care experienced in the
middle decades of the last century. Perhaps it is on the
cusp of doing so now. By way of thinking about how
better information, better incentives, and pressure for
change might combine to produce many billions or
even some trillions of dollars in new value over
the next decade or two, we conclude by drawing
attention to the emerging science of health care
delivery.

The Promise of Comparative Efficiency
Medical patients are not airplanes, but if they
were, we would know far more than we do today
about how to treat them effectively and efficiently.
This is not only because humans are even more
complicated than airplanes; it is also because every
step of the complicated pathway that turns a heap
of aluminum ore into a jetliner has undergone the
scrutiny of analysts seeking to find and propagate best
practices, whereas virtually none of the complicated
pathways that begin when you see your doctor have
undergone such scrutiny.
A company that builds airplanes carefully
monitors and adjusts its assembly process—or, rather,
processes, since hundreds of separate procedures

need to be streamed together. How many steps does
assembly require? Is there an unnecessary step
slowing everything down? Where are the bottlenecks?
Why does one factory produce higher quality or
operate more safely than another? Which vendors
perform best, and how can underperformers be
improved? The costs of inputs—raw materials, labor,
parts, subcontractors—are closely monitored and
mined for savings. Output, too, gets watched: the
airplane quality is checked; the production speed
clocked; the customers’ approval gauged.
Health care is different. One reason, and a
good one, is that people aren’t planes and do not
want to be treated as objects on an assembly line.
Medicine faces inherent limits to the desirability and
effectiveness of standardization and benchmarking
that no industrial manufacturer needs to think about.
But then, there are the many bad reasons health
care is different. One is that, as we have seen, what
we call “health care” is, in fact, a huge assortment
of procedures, tests, treatments, diagnostic methods,
and personnel choices that grew up rapidly in the
second half of the last century with minimal testing
of whether they actually led to improved health. Once
past regulatory approval (if approval was needed), a
treatment was subject only to physicians’ approval
or disapproval—perhaps a reasonable enough
arrangement when medicine was a much simpler
science, but an invitation to chaos today.
A second bad reason is that, again, as we
have seen, health providers, unlike airplane
manufacturers, save no money by finding efficiencies;
in fact, becoming more efficient normally costs them
money by reducing the number of procedures they
perform. Given the perverse incentives of fee-forservice payment, it would be a wonder if any health
provider ever considered efficiency at all.

production processes and quality-improvement
techniques inspired by Japanese manufacturing.
“We map out the current processes,” an official of
University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics in Iowa City
recently said. “We start to identify which steps are
non-value-added from the customer perspective.”76
Others use software and other analytical tools to track
labor costs and treatment flows, reducing waiting
times and hospitalization stays.
Meanwhile, some research organizations perform research on comparative efficiency. A prominent
example is the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy
and Clinical Practice, whose Dartmouth Atlas project
mines Medicare data to document “glaring variations
in how medical resources are distributed and used in
the United States.”77 It documents, for example, the
wide range across regions and hospitals in the number
of chronically ill patients seeing more than ten doctors
in their last six months of life (46 percent in Sun City,
a retirement community near Phoenix; only 15 percent
in Salt Lake City); in the rates at which patients receive
preference-sensitive discretionary surgery such as knee
or hip replacements; and in the rates at which patients
are admitted to the hospital, a decision that often has
little science behind it. “The prevalence and severity of
illness accounts for remarkably little of the variation in
care,” according to the Institute.78
Needless to say, hospitals’ efforts to
rationalize their treatment pathways are welcome.
Comparative analysis of the sort Dartmouth is
performing with Medicare data helps flag outliers
whose practices may be particularly costly or
inefficient. But hospitals adapting Japanese
production methods will themselves remain outliers
as long as payment incentives are to maximize inputs

 ave DeWitte, “Hospitals Keep an Eye on Costs.” Business380, July 31, 2011. http://business380.com/2011/07/31/hospitals-keep-an-eye-onD
costs/. Accessed September 1, 2011.
77 Shannon Brownlee, a member of the present task force, is affiliated with the Dartmouth Institute.
78 http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/topic/. Accessed September 1, 2011.
76

Kauffman Task Force on Cost-Effective Health Care Innovation

Suppose, then, the same patient goes to two
hospitals complaining of back pain. Hospital No. 1
gives her an MRI. Her scan turns up something that
might be disc damage, so she is sent to a neurologist,
who orders more tests, leading to a cascade of further
procedures and possibly surgery. Hospital No. 2,
looking at the same patient with the same pain—or,
for that matter, even Physician No. 2 at Hospital No.
1—diagnoses uncomplicated back pain and tells the
patient to take Advil® and see if the pain goes away
on its own, and maybe also refers her to a physical
therapist.
Which pathway is better, for this particular
patient or on average? The startling answer is
that no one knows, because patient outcomes of
various medical pathways are not systematically
measured. Comparative effectiveness research,
which we discussed in Chapter Three and which
is beginning to receive more effort and attention,
can help answer that question. However, another
comparative dimension has been even more
neglected: comparative efficiency. Of many
possible care pathways, which achieve the best
ratios of outputs to inputs? Where relative value—
not just relative efficacy—is concerned, the pathways
through treatment have never been systematically
compared, analyzed, or rationalized. In many cases,
hospitals and providers do not even systematically
track the costs of inputs, because they were in a
position to pass those costs along.
Very embryonically, this is beginning to change
as more providers and policymakers have awakened
to the need to analyze and rationalize treatment
pathways and input-output relationships. Some
hospitals, for example, are instituting “lean”
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and volume of care delivered. And Medicare data
of the sort that Dartmouth analyzes can reveal that
some hospitals, say, are more efficient than others, but
it lacks the granularity to look into the “black box”
of a particular hospital and uncover the particular
pathways that account for its relative standing—and,
of course, it provides data only on the relatively elderly
Medicare population.
We believe that comparative efficiency research
is ripe to be taken to a new level. If it were applied
in health care with anything like the regularity and
granularity taken for granted in, say, manufacturing,
the savings could be astronomical, and outcomes
would be better to boot. How, then, to reach a new
level? We see at least four places to exert leverage:
First, employers can and should demand that
providers do a better job of tracking efficiency. More
than 80 percent of large companies (those with 500
or more employees) self-insure for at least one health
plan.79 They have clout with providers and in their
communities, but to date have made little use of
it. Many tend to take a passive attitude toward the
health care bills they pay as insurers, rather than
viewing those costs as potentially manageable
expenses—subject to the same kinds of negotiations
with vendors as are other expenses and inputs. Too
often, health care is relegated to the HR department
and treated as a given, rather than subjected to the
MBA-style scrubbing that production expenses receive.
If health care production needs to be treated more
like aircraft production, at least where efficiency is
concerned, that is partly because the kinds of people
who produce aircraft have not turned their attention
to health care, even when they are paying for it. This
lacuna not only ought to change, but, we suspect,
gradually will as business, like government, discovers
79

it can no longer pour money into the black hole of
health care (though we acknowledge that there will
be resistance from various parties along the way).
Second, that word again: data. Medicare data is
a start, but it covers only one demographic group (the
elderly), records procedures but not medical outcomes
(other than death), and is published with long lags.
For comparative efficiency analysis to attain anything
like its full potential, more data will need to be
available more quickly. The government should
report Medicare data with a lag of weeks or months,
and the cost to receive it should be reduced.
More important, however, is bringing to bear
the torrent of data collected by health insurance
providers, which, between them, record most of the
medical procedures that non-elderly Americans
undergo. Unfortunately, insurance companies tend
to resist sharing data, even though using it for
comparative efficiency research could be a boon to
them. We believe that governments could help by
providing incentives to share and upload insurance
data, and by providing reasonable shelter from
litigation for companies that join the information
stream.
Even then, however, having the data is only
one step. A new system must be created and
staffed with the right kind of people. This requires
individuals with the right kinds of analytical training
to distill knowledge from the more expansive data
universe and to learn from experience. All this will
need to be carried out while subjecting the people to
whom the data pertain to the least acceptable risk,
almost surely with rules that foster the common good
while protecting individual rights and interests. The
data analysts whom we will need to carry out these
new and critically important functions will be trained

 .S. Department of Health and Human Services, Report to the Congress on a Study of the Large Group Market, 2011. http://aspe.hhs.gov/
U
health/reports/2011/LGHPstudy/index.shtml. Accessed September 1, 2011.

ACOs from procedure-based reimbursement—global
payments incentivize providers to find savings, not to
pass along costs.
Global payments remain in their infancy, and early
results are mixed. Examining global payments used
by some insurers in Massachusetts, for instance, that
state’s attorney general recently found that “globally
paid providers do not have consistently lower total
medical expenses.” Reforming payment structures
alone, the A.G. found, is not enough: “It is [also]
essential that businesses and consumers be engaged
in efforts to promote a value-based health care
market” by being given incentives and information to
seek value.81 That global payments offer no immediate
magic bullet solution will come as no surprise to those
who appreciate the theme of this chapter, health
delivery’s complexity. Reform, like a sophisticated plan
of treatment, must take multiple pathways and will
take years to penetrate throughout the system.
The case for moving away from fee-for-service
is not that it will solve the problem by itself (nothing
will do that) or that it will have dramatic effects
immediately (nothing will do that, either), but that
it is a necessary element of change, especially in
the long term. Bringing analytical rigor to the
production process will take years in health care, as
it did in manufacturing; but getting incentives right
is the necessary precondition of making the science
of health care delivery part of the everyday fabric of
the health care business, which eventually it should
become.
Although, as we have often said, we do not
believe in magic bullets, we do believe in low-hanging
fruit. Developing a science of health care delivery and
realizing its findings—rather than going about all

In 2009, the NIH spent roughly $1.1 billion of its total research budget on health services research. See Coalition for Health Services Research.
“2009 Federal Funding for Health Services Research.” May 2010. http://www.chsr.org/reports.htm.
81 Office of Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley, Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost Drivers, June 22, 2011, pp. 5
and 51.
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and housed in universities, in hospitals, in
pharmaceutical companies, and very likely, in
entirely new kinds of entities.
Third, the science of health care delivery
deserves its own national research program. Today,
comparative efficiency research is overshadowed by
comparative effectiveness research, which itself claims
a mere sliver of the $30 billion the United States
spends on health research—almost all of it devoted
to biomedical research; less than 4 percent of research
funding goes toward understanding how the caredelivery ecosystem actually works.80 If the study of
care delivery were a medical science, it would still be
in the era of Harvey and Leeuwenhoek, aware that
blood circulates and that bacteria exist but not
knowing much more than that.
Finally, and not least important: for
comparative efficiency analysis to become
common currency in American health care,
providers need to be given incentives to do it. This is
yet another reason to move away from fee-for-service
payment, with its upside-down incentive structure.
Accountable care organizations, discussed previously,
are one example of a potentially upright incentive
structure. A further step away from fee-for-service
would be taken by so-called “global payments,”
under which providers are reimbursed not for
procedures performed on individuals but for the
health outcomes attained with a group of patients
over a set period of time. In effect, providers receive
a fixed budget to take responsibility for the health of a
certain number of people; the more efficiently they do
that (within acceptable quality guidelines), the more
profitable they will be. As with accountable care
organizations—but moving even further than many
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too much of what health care does in a more or less
random fashion—is perhaps the lowest-hanging and
ripest fruit on the tree.

A Choice of Paths
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We conclude by asking ourselves a question.
Where is the American health care system today?
We know, at any rate, where it came from. A
half-century and more ago, most doctors were family
physicians, and specialists were exotic beasts, seen on
rare occasions for difficult cases.82 A well-informed
physician could know a lot of what there was to know
about medicine. Many conditions had only a handful
of treatment paths. Insurance did not cost very much
because, among other reasons, medicine could not
do all that much. Medicare did not exist. Late-life
treatment was relatively cheap, because so many
retirees died young (by today’s standards), instead
of living for years with multiple chronic conditions.
Insurance was linked to employment because of a
World War II era tax break; payment was linked to
procedures because, in a less complicated world, that
seemed a natural way to bill. Incentives were aligned
with the idiosyncrasies of the time, and, in that era,
they were more or less functional. America had good
health care, given the state of medical science at the
time. And it had a good health care system.
But where, exactly, is the health care system
today? The answer is that it might be in either of two
places. It might be forging ahead technologically but
mired structurally in the past. The system’s incentives
remain, alas, much as they were fifty years ago, and
Medicare’s fee-for-service structure has helped
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keep them there; but the world has changed and
the old incentives are anachronistic to the point of
dysfunctionality. If left unchanged, they cannot help
but provoke—or, rather, hasten—the systemic crisis
that is already beginning to occur.
Or the system might be somewhere else. It might
be at the doorstep of a gradual but eventually decisive
transition to improvement and efficiency. It might be
at a place where previously undreamt-of analytical
tools, sifting through mountains of previously
inaccessible information, can give the system the
knowledge about effectiveness and the awareness
of itself that it has lacked; where paths beyond feefor-service are clearly visible ahead; where patients,
providers, and even politicians are coming to
recognize the inevitability and desirability of change;
and where, in pockets of innovation around the
country, change is proving its mettle.
We don’t pretend to be sure where the system is.
But we think it is in the latter place. And we believe
the suggestions in this report can help make it so.

Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry
(Basic Books, 1984).
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